Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs:
Lessons from Economics and History

DONALD J. BOUDREAUX' & A.C. PRITCHARD"

This Article uses economic analysis to show how
civil forfeiture creates perverse incentives for law enforcement officials and encourages abuses. The Article then
surveys the history of civil forfeiture and the Supreme
Court :S forfeiture jurisprudence. Finding the Court :S
jurisprudence incoherent, the Article proposes a constitutional framework for civil forfeiture grounded in historical
practice. Adopting that framework would go far toward
reining in civil forfeiture :S abuses.
Congress and federal law enforcement officials have increasingly
employed civil forfeiture to combat the illegal drug trade. The
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (the
"Drug Act") provides for the forfeiture of illegal narcotics and property
used in manufacturing and distributing drugs. 1 Since 1970, Congress
has added two noteworthy items to the Drug Act's list of forfeitable
property: (1) monies used in and proceeds from drug trafficking;2 and
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(2) real property. 3 These additions have made civil forfeiture especially
lucrative for law enforcement authorities because the law enforcement
agency keeps the forfeiture proceeds. 4 Moreover, civil forfeiture carries
an important procedural advantage over the criminal law. Rather than
holding the government to the higher criminal standard of proof,
"beyond a reasonable doubt," Congress has provided that the government
need only prove that "probable cause" supports the forfeiture. 5 The
combination of huge returns and a minimal burden of proof has led law
enforcement authorities to escalate their use of civil forfeiture to an
unprecedented level.
Civil forfeiture, despite its long historical pedigree in enforcing
revenue laws, sits uneasily between civil and criminal law, between
taxation and prohibition. In this Article, we model civil forfeiture as a
"sin tax" to analyze its sometimes conflicting goals: prohibition and
revenue raising. We examine the economic incentives provided by civil
forfeiture as a window into the question of why legislators and law
enforcement officials have expended such enormous resources waging
the war on drugs. Our analysis shows that discouraging drug use may
be only a secondary goal of the war on drugs, and that revenue
considerations determine the vigor with which law enforcement
authorities attack the drug trade. We conclude that the judiciary should
be skeptical of civil forfeiture and its importance to the war on drugs.
We propose a constitutional framework, grounded both in economics and
history, to limit forfeiture abuses.
In Part I, we develop an economic model of civil forfeiture's role in
the war on drugs. We rely on an economic approach to political
behavior to analyze the incentives that shape the legal regime Congress
has adopted to enforce drug prohibitions. We focus in particular on civil
forfeiture's uneasy status as a form of quasi-sin tax in the twilight zone
3.
The Act also provided an "innocent owner" defense for the first time. See
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(7) (1994). That provision,
in relevant part states:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
(7) All real property ... which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner
or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this
subchapter punishable by more than one year's imprisonment, except that no
property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of
an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have
been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
The Act also provided for criminal forfeiture in all felony drug cases. 21 U.S.C. § 853
(1994).
4.
28 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1994).
5.
19 u.s.c. § 1615 (1994).
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between the ordinary taxation of legal goods and the outright prohibition
of criminalized goods. We examine civil forfeiture to determine where
its costs fall and benefits accrue. We first analyze politicians' choice
between taxation and prohibition, and the incentives leading politicians
to adopt a forfeiture regime. We then highlight forfeiture's incentives
for law enforcement agents and prosecutors. We show how enforcement
authorities maximizing rent-seeking opportunities in drug markets are
likely to over-enforce drug laws. This over-enforcement of the drug
laws necessarily impairs the enforcement of other criminal prohibitions,
and indeed probably leads to more violence and property crimes. Civil
forfeiture blends the ordinarily distinct sectors of civil and criminal law
together with unfortunate consequences for criminal law enforcement.
In Part II, we briefly sketch the history of forfeiture in England. We
then tum to Congress's expansion of the use of civil forfeiture in this
country, and the Supreme Court's response. Traditionally, the Court has
deferred to Congress's use of civil forfeiture. In particular, the Court
has sanctioned Congress's abandonment of the common law requirement
that the government first obtain a criminal conviction before obtaining
real property through forfeiture. In tum, Congress has relied on the
Court's deference by enacting civil forfeiture provisions going well
beyond civil forfeiture's traditional domain. Specifically, Congress has
exploited the freedom afforded by the Court's abandonment of common
law requirements by adopting civil forfeiture as an additional sanction
for criminal prohibitions. In several recent cases, however, the Court
has backed away from its deferential posture, demonstrating increasing
skepticism toward Congress's use of civil forfeiture.
In Part III, we evaluate the Court's response to the government's
recent expansion of civil forfeiture. We find that response wanting.
While the economic analysis presented in Part I supports constitutional
checks on civil forfeiture, the Court's response fails to put coherent
limits on civil forfeiture because it relies on a variety of ad hoc exercises
to check particular abuses. We offer an alternative constitutional
framework, grounded in the common law and the historical function of
civil forfeiture, to safeguard against civil forfeiture's unique abuses. Our
rule is simple: the government must obtain a criminal conviction to
obtain real property through forfeiture.
Where Congress has
criminalized primary conduct and the criminal actor is subject to in
personam jurisdiction, all forfeiture proceedings for real property should
require a prior criminal conviction. Thus, property owners would be
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guaranteed the procedural safeguards that the Constitution affords
criminal defendants.
We conclude in Part IV with some observations about the Court's role
in safeguarding constitutional traditions, and the risks of constitutional
innovation. In our view, the history of civil forfeiture should give the
Court pause when it is tempted to depart from long-established
traditions. While the first departure may seem innocuous, government
rent-seeking naturally flows into the precedential gaps created by those
departures, paving the way for future abuses. The history of civil
forfeiture shows that judges, like other government officials, cannot
evade the law of unintended consequences.
I.

THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL FORFEITURE

A.

Civil Forfeiture and the Legislature

Why do politicians criminalize goods demanded by many people?
Economics answers that interest groups demand such statutes. If
prohibition works (i.e., if commerce in the commodity is reduced or
stopped altogether), politicians gain votes by eliminating goods intensely
disliked by a sufficiently large block of voters. But even if prohibition
is ineffective, voters may still be swayed by the posturing of politicians,
who often stumble over each other in their efforts to "get tough on
crime." Prohibition creates an instant crime problem as market
participants attempt to evade the prohibition. Politicians milk votes and
contributions by purporting to solve the problem by spending more on
police and prisons.
Political benefits from prohibition, however, are never free. When
prohibition works, politicians suffer a real cost: outlawed goods yield
no tax revenues. Thus, legislators have fewer resources to (re)distribute
in ways that enhance their re-election chances. Ineffective prohibition
also imposes costs on politicians. Legislators find it both difficult and
politically embarrassing to tax goods whose circulation has been made
illegal. If the prohibited commodity continues to be distributed, and
politicians collect tax revenues from that distribution, voters may
question the politicians' resolve in enforcing the prohibition. 6 In short,
legislators feel the pain of foregone tax revenues when they consider
prohibiting certain substances, and as a result, generally avoid outright
prohibition. Legislators will outlaw only those commodities intensely

6.
Moreover, there are now constitutional bounds on the amount of such taxes.
See Department of Revenue of Mont. v, Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
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disliked by large numbers of voters, for only those commodities will
yield political benefits outweighing the foregone revenues. 7
Civil forfeiture frees politicians from this political constraint on
prohibition.
Forfeiture surreptitiously taxes formally prohibited
substances. It permits seizure of contraband, and more importantly,
seizure of valuable items used as "instrumentalities" in distributing
contraband. Many instrumentalities are perfectly legal goods, such as
automobiles used to transport marijuana. The government retains the
proceeds when it liquidates seized items. In this way, government
extracts revenues from the black market while still purporting to
vigorously enforce prohibition. By varying the intensity of enforcement,
government controls the amount of revenues extracted through civil
forfeiture. Self-interested politicians will choose the enforcement level
yielding the highest net revenues. Thus, civil forfeiture reduces the
political cost of voting for prohibition. Politicians receive kudos by
voting for prohibition, without sacrificing tax revenues ordinarily
extracted from legal markets. 8 Therefore, politicians face lower costs
by voting to prohibit disfavored substances, which leads to more formal
prohibitions.
Civil forfeiture poses additional problems as a tax. These problems
stem from the methods used to collect these taxes and the political
effects on the government agencies that receive them. Specifically:
•
law enforcement agencies keep the proceeds from civil forfeitures;9
•
civil forfeiture proceeds are collected from only a small and
politically unorganized subgroup of the population; 10 and

7.
Congress repealed alcohol prohibition in 1933 during the fiscal crisis of the
Great Depression. This repeal occurred---and occurred when it did-because the
Depression substantially reduced incomes (and, hence, income tax revenues). Congress
was desperate for taxes available from legally sold liquor. See Donald J. Boudreaux &
A.C. Pritchard, The Price of Prohibition, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. I (1994).
8.
Consequently, government gains a stake in the formally prohibited
industry-an industry which, in the case of drugs, supplies hundreds of millions of
dollars annually in revenue to government. In I 992 alone, federal civil forfeitures were
worth approximately $900 million. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS tbl. 4.43 (1992).
9.
See discussion infra part J.B.
I 0.
See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
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•

constitutional protections against government abuses are too often
ignored in the civil forfeiture context. 11
Because law enforcement agencies retain the proceeds extracted
through civil forfeiture, members of these agencies coalesce into an
interest group favoring, and lobbying for, civil forfeiture statutes (as well
as their attendant prohibitions). Law enforcement officials campaign to
expand the reach of prohibition and fight to minimize constitutional and
statutory restraints on the use of forfeiture. 12
Legislators benefit from civil forfeiture in two ways: ( 1) civil
forfeiture frees up funds that would otherwise have gone to law
enforcement agencies; and (2) civil forfeiture increases the cost of
prohibited substances, thus fostering more violence in the outlawed
industry. Politicians exploit this violence to expand government power,
notwithstanding their role in fostering the very criminal activity that they
rail against. They pedal ever more draconian criminal sanctions to
voters as solutions to the problem of increased crime.
Civil forfeiture also taxes in a random fashion. Civil forfeiture
initially may appear to be a carefully targeted "user fee" that imposes a
larger share of the fiscal burden on criminals. Appearances, however,
deceive here. Civil forfeiture allows government to confiscate assets
without abiding by constitutional restrictions designed to protect innocent
citizens from over-vigorous prosecution of criminal laws. Civil
forfeiture would impose a greater burden on criminals if the government
were required to prove that property owners in fact had engaged in
criminal conduct, but the procedures used afford no such assurance. For
example, law enforcement agencies need only show probable cause for
suspicion of illegal use to seize property; to retrieve the property, the
owner must prove his or her innocence. 13 The government's burden of

11.
See infra part III.
12.
See Bruce L. Benson et al., Police Bureaucracies, Their Incentives, and the
War on Drugs, 83 PuB. CHOICE 21 (1995). An agency's quest for forfeiture proceeds
(in addition to concern for personal security) may help explain support by law
enforcement agencies for gun control and, particularly, bans on assault weapons: heavily
armed drug dealers can better protect their properties from government officials. But
this speculation may be inaccurate. If gun control reduces the drug dealer's armories,
the profitability of dealing drugs may decline because turf protection would be more
costly. In tum, reduced drug-crime profitability might reduce the aggregate value of
seizable assets. Alternatively, law enforcement agencies may support gun control
because voters regard guns as substitutes for police protection services. By reducing the
number of guns possessed by law-abiding citizens, the demand for police services
increases, especially if gun control reduces gun possession by criminals proportionately
less than gun possession by noncriminals.
13.
United States v. 900 Rio Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d 625, 629 (11th Cir. 1986)
("Once the government demonstrates that probable cause exists, the burden of proof in
a civil forfeiture proceeding shifts to the [ownerJ to establish by a preponderance of the
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proof is slight relative to the burden in a criminal prosecution. In a
criminal case, the accused enjoys a presumption of innocence and can
be convicted and punished only if the government proves beyond a
reasonable doubt-to the satisfaction of a jury-that he has committed
a crime. Thus, the government can more readily confiscate properties
under civil forfeiture than it can convict people of criminal offenses.
Minimal procedures inevitably lead to erroneous determinations. Civil
forfeiture, by eliminating procedural safeguards, assures that too many
innocent people will be burdened by taxes not shared by their fellow
citizens. Criminal procedures exist not to make life easier for criminals,
but to reduce government error in punishing noncriminals to a tolerable
level. Civil forfeiture causes too many innocent people to have their
properties seized and converted to government revenues, while similarly
situated (i.e., equally innocent) people escape this tax.
The random manner in which the government levies civil forfeiture
taxes hides a part of the cost of the war on drugs from taxpayer scrutiny.
A disproportionate share of these costs are foisted upon owners of
property that law enforcement agencies suspect was used in drug
trafficking. This group is politically unorganized and, hence, cannot
adequately defend itself against more cohesively organized lobbies, such
as law enforcement agencies, who clamor for liberalized civil forfeiture.
Property owners at risk of forfeiture remain unorganized because they
cannot identify themselves as members of the affected group before
having their properties forfeited. The potential forfeiture of property is
typically a one-time, low-probability occurrence for each property owner.
Thus, they have little incentive to form or to join lobbying groups to
press for the repeal or reform of civil forfeiture statutes. 14
The proceeds from civil forfeiture thus partially relieve the general
body of taxpayers from the burden of paying taxes for the public good
of law enforcement. 15 Because taxpayers do not feel the full cost of

evidence that the property is not subject to forfeiture.").
14. See generally A.C. Pritchard, Note, Government Promises and Due Process:
An Economic Analysis of the "New Property," 77 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1069-74 (1991).
15. As we discuss below, insofar as government is excused from the inconvenience of abiding by the Constitution, members of the subgroup bearing the burden of
the civil forfeiture tax are not sufficiently likely to be criminals. In those cases,
majoritarian outcomes are likely to trample the rights of politically weak groups, thus
justifying constitutional restraints on government. The Bill of Rights protects accused
criminals from government overreaching, discouraging baseless prosecutions of innocent
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government, as they would if law enforcement was funded entirely by
direct taxes, the result is excessively large government in general, and
overly aggressive drug-law enforcement in particular. 16

B.

Civil Forfeiture and the Nonoptimality of Law Enforcement

We showed above how civil forfeiture allows the legislature to exploit
a revenue source partially hidden from taxpayers. In this section, we
explore civil forfeiture's consequences for executive branch decisions,
and in particular, the consequences of allowing law enforcement agencies
to keep seizure proceeds.
First, however, we must review some basic economics of law
enforcement. Law enforcement, like other goods, is scarce. 17 Resources used to enforce criminal laws could be used to construct bridges and
highways, educate children, or provide social services. Alternatively,
taxes can be kept lower so that private citizens can allocate their
resources through their own individual decisions. Thus, efforts to
eliminate all criminal activity would not be socially worthwhile. After
some point, the gains from using additional resources to police against
crime--even heinous crimes such as murder and rape--become smaller
than the gains available from using these same resources elsewhere.
As with all economic choices, the optimal amount of law enforcement
occurs when the marginal benefit to society from an additional unit of
enforcement equals the marginal cost of the resources used to produce

people.
l 6.
Much of the cost of civil forfeiture seizures ultimately falls on lessees. A
landlord who knows civil forfeiture understands that he faces some positive chance of
losing his property due to drug offenses committed by his tenants. This landlord will
thus raise the rent. By transferring a portion of the cost of government to tenants, a
form of "fiscal illusion" is created. Fiscal illusion is (rational) ignorance about the full
costs of government. As the cost of government becomes more and more detached from
explicit tax payments (e.g., by being hidden in higher rental rates), fiscal illusion
increases. Larger than optimal government is the consequence. See DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE Il 342 (1989). Mueller states:
The fiscal illusion explanation for government size assumes that citizens
measure the size of government by the size of their tax bill. To bring about
an increase in government size, for which citizens are not willing to pay
voluntarily, the legislative-executive entities must increase the citizens' tax
burden in such a way that the citizens are unaware that they are paying more
in taxes.
Id.

17. See Morgan 0. Reynolds, The Economics of Criminal Activity, in THE
ECONOMICS OF CRJME 24, 45 (Ralph Andreano & John J. Siegfried, eds., 1980) ("[l]f
all crime could be prevented at zero cost, it would pay to stop all crime. But crime
prevention, as we well know, consumes valuable resources, so that it only pays to
expand the law enforcement industry to the point where the value of the additional harm
prevented is equal in value to the resources consumed.").

86

[VOL. 33: 79, 1996]

Civil Forfeiture
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

that additional enforcement. And what is true for law enforcement in
general also holds for choices among alternative areas of law enforcement. Each type of crime fighting entails costs. Devoting more crimefighting resources to apprehending murderers means that fewer resources
are available to police against vice offenses and other illegal activities,
and vice versa. 1
Figure 1 (following page) depicts the costs and benefits of enforcing
drug prohibition. In the top panel, the horizontal axis measures the
quantity of drug-law enforcement, while the vertical axis shows the
dollar value of the costs and benefits of such enforcement. The marginal
benefit curve (MB) shows the gains to society of each additional unit of
drug-crime enforcement; the marginal cost curve (MC) shows the costs
of those additional units of enforcement. Enforcement beyond E* is
excessive because the benefits from further drug crime reductions are
worth less than the goods and services thereby sacrificed. Similarly,
enforcement less than E* is suboptimal because the gains from additional
enforcement then exceed the costs. Therefore, any institutional
arrangement affecting law enforcement should be assessed by how likely
it is to encourage the optimal amount of enforcement. By giving law
enforcement officials a disproportionate stake in drug-crime enforcement,
civil forfeiture creates a powerful incentive for law enforcement agents
to exceed the optimal, E*, amount of drug-crime enforcement.
The lower panel of Figure 1 shows civil forfeiture revenues that law
enforcement agents retain as funds for their agencies. 19 These revenues
can be depicted using the familiar "Laffer curve," which shows the
relationship between tax rates and tax receipts. 20 If the agency engages
in no drug-crime enforcement, it will gain no revenues from drug-related
civil forfeiture (point 0). At the other extreme, if the agency enforces
drug laws so vigorously as to eliminate illegal drug operations, civil

18.
See Benson et al., supra note 12 (showing that increased drug law
enforcement reduces police efforts to thwart non-drug violent and property crimes,
resulting in an increase in these latter crimes). See also Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip:
Drug Prohibition and the Weakness of Public Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2593 (1994).
19.
Empirical studies of civil forfeiture's effect upon the size of an enforcement
agency's budget indicate that forfeitures "have a significant positive impact on noncapital expenditures by police agencies." Civil forfeiture increases the discretionary
budgets of law enforcement bureaus. See Benson et al., supra note 12, at 22.
20.
See James D. Gwartney, Supply-Side Economics, in THE FORTUNE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 165 (David R. Henderson, ed., 1993) (explaining the
Laffer Curve).
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forfeiture revenues also will be zero. With no drug crime, there is no
opportunity for drug-related civil forfeitures (point B). Between points
0 and B, however, civil forfeiture revenues are positive. Civil forfeiture
revenues increase as drug-crime enforcement expands from no enforcement toward greater enforcement. After some point, however, greater
enforcement reduces drug trafficking to such an extent that the dollar
amounts available from seizures also will be reduced.
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Revenues from seizures are maximized at EF. EF is the 'optimal' level
of enforcement for law enforcement agencies allowed to keep proceeds
from civil forfeiture seizures. Law enforcement agencies will determine
the intensity of their drug enforcement efforts------and, by necessary
implication, the intensity of their efforts to enforce laws against non-drug
crimes---by how such efforts affect their civil forfeiture revenues. Thus,
revenue effects of drug crime enforcement, rather than social welfare
consequences, will determine the allocation of police efforts attacking
various kinds of criminal behaviors.
No necessary correlation exists between EF (agency-revenue maximizing) and E' (social optimum). EF could be to the right or to the left of
E'; only by chance will EF fall at E'. Allowing law enforcement
agencies to retain proceeds from civil forfeitures affords agencies
discretion over their budgets. As a consequence, agencies produce either
sub- or supra-optimal drug enforcement, leaving society worse off.
The alternative to giving an agency discretion over its budget is to
reserve that discretion exclusively for the legislature. When a legislature
determines an entire budget for a law enforcement agency, that
legislature, in effect, chooses a quantity of law enforcement. With its
budget set by a legislature, the law enforcement agency then allocates its
monies among the different categories of crime fighting. In this
scenario, no one type of crime has a 'revenue advantage' over others in
attracting law enforcement resources. 21 The heads of law enforcement
agencies will thus make more rational enforcement decisions.
The legislature is the most appropriate branch of government to
determine the law enforcement budget because it confronts many
constituencies vying for public funds. Therefore, legislatures are better
positioned than a specialized bureaucracy to determine if an additional
dollar of public revenue should be used for law enforcement, schooling,
or social welfare programs. 22 To be sure, Public Choice23 economics

21.
Although without forfeiture, drug-law enforcement would have no revenue
advantage over other law enforcement activities, drug arrests and seizures may provide
more visible evidence of bureaucratic output than, for example, a drop in the number of
burglaries. But even if such a 'bureaucratic-output' bias exists, it is worse if
enforcement agencies retain civil forfeiture proceeds.
22. See Reynolds, supra note 17, at 45 ("through [the] political process, the
community is deciding how much and what kinds of crime to have").
23. "Public Choice" refers to the use of economic analysis to explain political
institutions and outcomes.
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indicates that legislatures are unlikely to tax, spend, and regulate in ways
that maximize society's well being. 24 Even so, legislatures should still
allocate civil forfeiture proceeds more efficiently than law enforcement
bureaucrats. 25
Furthermore, we believe that drug laws are inefficiently over-enforced.
Over-enforcement results from the victimless nature of drug use. 26 The
crime consists of a transaction between willing sellers and buyers.
Americans, however, seem to prefer effective enforcement of laws
24.
See Gordon Tullock, Problems ofMajority Voting, 67 J. POL. ECON. 571,579
( 1959) ("[T]he system of majority voting is not by any means an optimal method of
allocating resources."). See also DWIGHT R. LEE & RICHARD B. MCKENZIE,
REGULATING GOVERNMENT (1987); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & ROBERT D. TOLLISON,
EDS., THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE-II (1984); ROBERT E. MCCORMICK & ROBERT
D. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, AND THE ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
INTEREST-GROUP THEORY OF GoVERNMENT (1981).
25.
See Roger D. Congleton & Robert D. Tollison, The Political Economy of
Crime, IO (Nov. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors) ("[l]t is
unlikely that law enforcement agencies would be directly responsive to the wishes of
voters. . . . [T]he allocation of enforcement activity which maximizes police budgets
differs from that which minimizes the net cost of crime to voters."). See also James C.
Miller III et al., A Note on Centralized Regulatory Review, 43 PUB. CHOICE 83 (1984)
("[J]fregulatory administration is decentralized, with rules issued piecemeal by a variety
of independent agencies, then concentrated interests will typically be more successful in
inducing regulators to fashion their decisions to benefit them. In contrast, a centralized
review process makes this outcome less likely."). Centralization of policymaking
reduces public decision-making bias because "centralization swns the individual welfare
losses created by the regulatory bodies subject to its jurisdiction." Id. at 86. A
legislature is a more centralized evaluator of law enforcement policy.
26.
Characterizing drug use as a victimless crime can be challenged. Critics
typically point to families and friends rendered distraught by drug abuse, lost
productivity, and increased burdens on the health care system. While we do not deny
that drug abuse causes genuine and often expensive tragedies, it remains, in our view,
a victimless crime. Drug use is victimless in the sense that no one is physically coerced,
defrauded, or blackmailed into acting against his or her will, or involuntarily stripped of
property. See Barnett, supra, note 18, at 262 l. This fact distinguishes drug use from
crimes such as murder, rape, and burglary.
Barnett persuasively argues that criminalizing noncoercive, nonfraudulent, and
nonthieving activities actually increases social costs because victimless crimes have no
complaining victims. Id. at 2621-25. Consequently, police must rely upon highly
invasive techniques to detect such crimes, to apprehend their perpetrators, and to gather
incriminating evidence. Constitutional protections are thereby imperiled.
Criminalizing victimless behavior also dilutes valuable disapproving attitudes about
criminal activity with victims. See STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S
LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS l 06 ( 1993). Duke
& Gross state:
Criminalizing behavior that is commonly engaged in by a substantial segment
of society inevitably debases the currency of criminal proscriptions. If a legal
system declares that both drug use and robbery are reprehensible, it is not only
making a moral statement about drug use, it is making a moral statement about
robbery.

Id.
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proscribing violence or fraud that harms nonconsenting parties, over a
"war on drugs" where the transactions are consensual. In 1990, in the
midst of drug war hysteria, the Drug Policy Foundation reported that
more than one in three Americans (36%) supported drug legalization. 27
More recently, in January 1994, NBC Nightly News conducted a
telephone call-in poll asking callers if drugs should be legalized. A
majority (52.2%) favored legalization. 28 As popular support for a law
decreases, the social benefit of enforcing that law decreases.
Enforcing such laws is also more expensive than policing violence and
theft because victimless crimes lack victims willing to testify against
lawbreakers. Thus, society gets more bang for its law enforcement buck
when it shifts law enforcement efforts from pursuing perpetrators of
victimless crimes to pursuing violators of personal and property
rights. 29
In Figure I, the decreased social benefits of drug-crime enforcement
are shown by a marginal benefit curve (MB') closer to the origin than
MB; the higher marginal costs of victimless-crime enforcement are
shown by a steeper marginal cost curve (MC'). The socially optimal
level of enforcement falls as well (to E*). Naturally, EF is more likely
to be to the right of E' as E" moves to the left. That is, the weaker the
consensus for outlawing drug use, and the less willing victims are to
testify against offenders, the more likely it is that enforcement agents
will over-enforce legal prohibitions that yield personal benefits for the
agents. If no widespread consensus exists for drug prohibition, then ci vii
forfeiture leads to inefficient over-enforcement of drug laws.

27.
"The American People Talk About Drugs," poll conducted by the Drug Policy
Foundation, Washington, D.C., April I990.
28. NBC Nightly News Phone Poll (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 4, I 994). Of
those responding, 42,812 callers supported legalization, while 39,254 opposed it.
Moreover, drug prohibitions are condemned by a number of prominent people. This
number includes former Secretary of State George Schulze, Baltimore Mayor Kurt
Schmoke, Nobel laureate Milton Friedman, and columnist William Buckley. DRUG
LEGALIZATION: FOR AND AGAINST (Rod L. Evans & Irwin M. Beran! eds., 1992).
29.
Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. I, 3 (1974) ("The society ... buys the
amount of enforcement which it deems appropriate to the statute or rule: more will be
bought if the statute serves a more valuable goal (protects us from murder rather than
assault) and if a given increase in enforcement is less expensive.").
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C.

Civil Forfeiture and Violence

Economic analysis teaches that penalties should match the seriousness
of the crime.Jo Holding the probability of apprehension and conviction
constant, perpetrators of more serious crimes should be punished more
severely than perpetrators of less serious crimes. If criminal penalties
are not matched to the increased social costliness of particular crimes,
criminals who commit less serious offenses are inadequately deterred
from committing more serious collateral crimes. If armed robbery and
murder carried the same penalty, an armed robber would have no
incentive not to kill his victims; the marginal cost of murder would be
zero. More murder would result than under a more carefully calibrated
penalty scheme.JI
Civil forfeiture, as a penalty for drug trafficking, is not related to the
seriousness of the crime. Forfeiture liability turns on the property's use
in the crime, rather than on the crime's seriousness. As a result, small
crimes can lead to large forfeitures. Because a drug dealer faces an
equal risk of forfeiture if he uses his automobile to transport marijuana
or crack cocaine, the civil forfeiture regime encourages a shift by the
dealer from marijuana distribution to the more lucrative crack distribution. As drug dealers shift their marketing efforts to harder drugs, users
are exposed to more expensive drugs with higher addiction rates. Crime
rates rise both because users find it more difficult to control their actions
while under the influence of these harder drugs, and because addiction
is often financed with property crime. Similarly, because drug dealers
stand to forfeit much of their property as a result of even the most minor
drug offenses, the marginal cost of defending themselves and their
property with violence during the commission of any drug crime is
lower than it would be if losses increased with the seriousness of the
offense.J 2 Thus, while civil forfeiture deters some drug crimes, it has
the perverse effect of encouraging nondrug crimes by drug users and sellers.

30.
See. e.g.• RlCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 223-31 (4th ed.
1992).
31.
Id. at 226 ("(O]ne cost of increasing the severity of punishment of a crime is
to reduce the incentive to substitute that crime for a more serious one.").
32.
Colombia's Attorney General, Gustavo de Greiff, calls for drug legalization,
primarily because of the link between prohibition and violence: "Our present approach
offers criminals, large and small, a profit margin that no honest business ordinarily
yields. In the process, we may be contributing to the generation of all the problems and
vices that accompany drugs, i.e., violence, corruption, and a generalized disregard for
law." Gustavo de Greiff, The Coke King Compromise: Colombia's Top Prosecutor on
Rethinking the Drug War, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1994, at Cl, C4. See also DANIEL K.
BENJAMIN & ROGER LEROY MILLER, UNDOING DRUGS 107-08 (1991).
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In sum, economic analysis indicates that civil forfeiture leads to: (1)
bigger government; (2) inefficient and overly aggressive enforcement of
the drug laws; and (3) increased violence and theft. Therefore,
economics suggests that courts should be skeptical of civil forfeiture's
expansion.
IL

A BRIEF HISTORY OF FORFEITURE

We turn now from economics to history. The history of civil
forfeiture helps explain how law enforcement officials obtained such a
dangerous weapon for fighting crime. After briefly reviewing preRevolutionary War English precedent, we turn to civil forfeiture's
use--and expansio~in America.

A.

English Practices

English law provided three methods of forfeiture: (1) deodand, (2)
attainder forfeitures, and (3) statutory forfeitures. 33 Traditionally,
conviction of the property owner was necessary for all forfeitures save
deodand.
Beginning in the seventeenth century, certain statutes---especially the Navigation Acts and revenue statutes--allowed for
in rem forfeiture procedures without prior criminal conviction. 34 In
rem procedures allowed the government to directly prosecute the
offending property, naming the property itself as the defendant. The
legal fiction was that the property itself, without human intervention,
caused the harm or violated the law. Thus, no conviction of the property
owner was required because legally the property owner was not being
punished; only the property was found 'guilty.'

33.
See infra notes 34-51.
34.
See Michael Schecter, Note, Fear and Loathing and the Forfeiture Laws, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1154 (I 990) ("The in rem proceeding ... developed in the
seventeenth century .... ")
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1.

Deodand35

A deodand is an instrument causing a person's death, e.g., a pistol or
a runaway carriage. Forfeiture to the Crown under the common law of
a deodand is the oldest in rem method of forfeiture. 36 The deodand
"may have served as an alternative to the blood feud of early justice-the instrument of death replacing the slayer's kin as the object of
vengeance."37 In theory, the Crown used the funds from the liquidated
deodand to pay for the funeral Mass of the deceased. In time, however,
the Crown actually profited from deodand. 38
Some courts have been tempted to explain modern in rem forfeiture
as evolving from deodand. 39 Like modern American forfeiture statutes
under which the government can proceed directly against offending
objects (e.g., a yacht used to transport marijuana) as if these objects were
culpable for the offense, the Crown proceeded directly against the
deodand as if it were guilty of a tort or crime. There is little evidence,
however, that modem forfeiture law descended from deodand, which was
carefully limited by the English courts. 4° First, and perhaps most
obvious, property became deodand only if it caused a human's death.
Second, "attempts to raise the analogy [of forfeiture to deodand] were
specifically rejected" by English courts. 41
More recently, Grant
Gilmore and Charles Black, in their treatise of admiralty, rejected Oliver
Wendell Holmes's contention that deodand is the evolutionary ancestor

35. The word "deodand" derives from the Latin Deo dandum, which means "to
be given to God." Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,681 n.16
(I 974).
36.
See id. at 681 (discussing the Biblical origins of deodand).
37.
James R. Maxeiner, Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at
Last? 62 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 768, 771 (1977).
38.
Id. ("[D]eodands were one of many prerogatives of the English kings,
providing a small but steady source of income.").
39.
See, e.g., Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681-90.
40.
See Schecter, supra note 34, at 1154 ("Modem forfeiture law originated,
independent of deodands, during England's seventeenth century maritime expansion.");
see also Maxeiner, supra note 37, at 772 ("The only English authority cited as proof that
deodand represents a general forfeiture principle is one sentence from St. Germain's
Doctor & Student dialogues, published in 1530 .... But a careful reading ... does not
support that conclusion." (footnotes omitted)).
41.
Maxeiner, supra, note 37, at 771. Maxeiner stated:
In 1766, in a case before the Court of the Exchequer, the Crown argued that
deodand represented a general principle of forfeiture law. Chief Baron Parker
rejected the argument, citing Chief Justice Vaughn for the proposition that
"goods as goods, cannot offend, forfeit, unlade, pay duties, or the like, but
[only] men whose goods they are."
Id. at 771-72 (citing Mitchell qui tam v. Torup, Parker 227, 145 Eng. Rep. 764 (Ex.
1766)) (footnotes omitted).
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of modem forfeiture law. 42 Finally, the superstition that inanimate
objects can be culpable for harming humans has been discarded with the
advance of science. 43

2.

Attainder Forfeitures

Attainder forfeiture was the largest class of forfeiture. 44 Generally,
under the law of attainder, the convicted felon's personal property was
forfeited to the Crown, while his real property was forfeited to his lord.
A conviction for treason, however, rendered all of the felon's property,
personal and real, forfeitable to the Crown. No property was forfeited
unless the owner of the property was first duly convicted of a criminal
offense. 45 The government proceeded against the property owner in
personam.

3.

Statutory Forfeitures

Although not the first English forfeiture statutes, the Navigation Acts
of the mid-seventeenth century were the first to allow for in rem
forfeiture. Prior to these Acts, "[i]f the owner was available, the
forfeiture evidently was imposed only upon confession or adjudication
of his guilt."46 The Navigation Acts were intended to strengthen
England's naval prowess. By requiring that most imports and exports
from England be carried in English ships, the Navigation Acts protected

42.
GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 590
(2d ed. 1975).
43.
See generally Walter W. Hyde, The Prosecution and Punishment of Animals
and Lifeless Things in the Middle Ages and Modem Times, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 696
(1916).
44.
Stuart D. Kaplan, Note, The Forfeiture of Profits Under the Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: Enabling Courts to Realize RICO 's
Potential, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 751 (1984).
45.
Blackstone justified forfeitures as an appropriate sanction for the property
owner's violation of the social compact. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 289 (1765). Blackstone stated:
The true reason and only substantial ground of any forfeiture for crimes
consists in this; that all property is derived from society, being one of those
civil rights which are conferred upon individuals, in exchange for that degree
of natural freedom, which every man must sacrifice when he enters into social
communities.

Id.
46.

Maxeiner, supra note 37, at 775.
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the English maritime industry from competition. 47 "Violation of the
Acts resulted in forfeiture of both the illegally carried goods and the ship
that transported them. The English courts construed these statutes so
that the act of an individual seaman, undertaken without the knowledge
of master or owner, could cause a forfeiture of the entire ship."48
Given the importance of the maritime industry to British commerce,
courts enforced the Acts strictly. Therefore, the Navigation Acts
exposed certain parties to forfeiture even absent guilt. According to
Chief Baron Parker of Exchequer, the Acts were:
negative, absolute, and prohibitory; ... there is not a syllable that hints at the
privity or consent of the master, mate or owners.
The reason of penning this clause in these strong terms is to prevent as much
as possible its being evaded, for if the privity or consent of the master, mate or
owners, had been made necessary to the forfeiture, it would have opened a door
for perpetual evasion, and the provisions of this excellent act for the increase
of the navigation would have been defeated."

Nevertheless, despite the "absolute" language of the Navigation Acts, the
courts did not interpret them as imposing strict liability upon ship
owners. If ship owners could not reasonably have known of the illegal
uses, juries could acquit the vessel. 5° For example, if the amount of
contraband was so small that the owner or master could not have found
it on board after a reasonable search, the ship was not forfeitable. 51

B.

Early American History

The English law of forfeiture influenced American law while not
strictly determining its course. The Constitution's framers did not
outlaw forfeiture in response to its perceived abuses in England, but they
did forbid bills of attainder,52 and they limited the penalty for treason
by providing that "no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted." 53
These reforms abolished the worst abuses of forfeiture. The first

47.
See 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 464-65 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner, eds., Liberty Classics
1981) (1776) ("As defence, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the act
of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England.").
Smith, of course, opposed the protectionist functions of the Acts. Id.
48.
Maxeiner, supra note 37, at 774 (footnotes omitted).
49.
Mitchell qui tam v. Torup, Parker 227, 232-33, 145 Eng. Rep. 764 (Ex. 1766).
50.
Maxeiner, supra note 37, at 775 ("Thus, under the Navigation Acts, forfeiture
of a ship carrying contraband was required only if the owner or his carefully chosen
master was implicated or negligent.").
51.
Id. n.44.
52.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
53.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
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Congress: ( l) adopted civil forfeiture to aid in the collection of customs
revenues; 54 and (2) abolished criminal forfeiture. 55
In a series of early cases, the Supreme Court laid the legal foundation
for current forfeiture practice. The Court adopted English in rem
forfeiture procedures in rejecting challenges to the forfeiture laws. The
early Court held that (1) forfeiture proceedings were civil rather than
criminal, and that no jury was required because the proceedings arose
under the admiralty jurisdiction; 56 (2) goods could be forfeited upon a
showing of probable cause of illegal importation; 57 (3) the forfeiture
"related back," vesting title in the government at the time of the
offense; 58 (4) the claimant, rather than the government, bore the burden
of proof; 59 (5) no criminal conviction was required for a forfeiture for
acts of piracy; 60 and (6) the property owner's innocence was no
defense. 61 Consistent with the in rem fiction that the "guilty" property
was the defendant, the Court also held that actual seizure of the ship was
required for a court to exercise jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction was lost
if the vessel departed the court's territorial jurisdiction. 62

54.
Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, I Stat. 145 (repealed 1799).
55.
Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, I Stat. 112, 117, repealed by Pub. L. No.
98-473, Tit. II,§ 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
56.
United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297, 301 (1796). Chief
Justice Marshall later distinguished forfeiture of goods seized on land, which were to be
tried to a jury under the common-law jurisdiction of the court. See The Sarah, 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat.) 391, 394 (1823).
57.
Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 345 (1813).
58.
United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398,405 (1814).
59.
The Langdon Cheves, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 103, 104 (1819); Locke, 11 U.S. at
348.
60.
The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) I, 14 (1827).
61.
United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 231-32 (1844).
62.
The Brig Ann, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 289, 290-91 (1815). The Court adopted
English in rem practice for forfeitures under the admiralty jurisdiction over two
substantial historical objections. Arguing that the Seventh Amendment required a jury,
former Attorney General Lee pointed out that "[a]II seizures [in England] for violation
of the laws of revenue, trade, or navigation are tried by a jury in the court of exchequer
according to the course of the common law." United States v. The Schooner Betsey and
Charlotte, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 443,447 (1808). Lee also urged that "[i]t was one of our
serious grievances, and of which we complained against Great Britain in our remonstrances to the King, and in our addresses to the people of Great Britain, while we were
colonies, that the jurisdiction of the courts of vice-admiralty was extended to cases of
revenue." Id. at 448. Chief Justice Marshall rejected Lee's argument on the basis of La
Vengeance, in which Lee had argued that a jury was required because the cause was
criminal. Id. at 452 (citing La Vengeance, 3 U.S. at 299). Justice Chase suggested that
Congress shared the Crown's motive in taking forfeiture from the jury: "The reason of
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Most important of these rulings is Justice Story's opinion upholding
a vessel's in rem forfeiture for piracy without a criminal conviction. He
summarized common law forfeiture:
It is well known;that at the common law, in many cases of felonies, the party
forfeited his goods and chattels to the crown. The forfeiture did not, strictly
speaking, attach in rem; but it was a part, or at least a consequence, of the
judgment of conviction. It is plain from this statement, that no right to the
goods and chattels of the felon could be acquired by the crown by the mere
commission of the offence; but the right attached only by the conviction of the
offender. The necessary result was, that in every case where the crown sought
to recover such goods and chattels, it was indispensable to establish its right by
producing the record of the judgment of conviction. 63

Justice Story went on, however, to distinguish common-law forfeitures
from in rem forfeitures created by statute and seizures in admiralty. In
those proceedings, forfeiture did not turn on the guilt of the offender;
rather, "[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the offender ... .''64
The forfeiture proceeding was independent of any criminal proceeding,
and the challenged statute did not even provide for criminal punishment. 65 Thus, "no personal conviction of the offender is necessary to
enforce a forfeiture in rem in cases of this nature."66
C.

Civil Forfeiture and the Civil War

The next series of forfeiture cases to reach the Court arose out of the
Confiscation Acts, which authorized the seizure of property owned by
Confederates and those aiding the rebellion. 67 The Acts authorized in
rem proceedings of both real and personal property, fashioned after the
forfeiture proceedings for personal property such as vessels and

the legislature for putting seizures of this kind on the admiralty side of the court was the
great danger to the revenue if such cases should be left to the caprices of juries." Id.
at 446 n.•. See also Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How,) 441,460 (1847) ("But there
is no provision, as the constitution originally was, from which it can be inferred that
civil causes in admiralty were to be tried by a jury, contrary to what the framers of the
constitution knew was the mode of trial of issues of fact in the admiralty."), Justice
Woodbury's dissent in Waring discusses at length the colonists' objections to the preRevolution expansion of admiralty by the Crown. Id. at 467. Justice Story's typically
learned opinion on circuit in De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No.
3,776), relates the history of the admiralty jurisdiction.
63.
The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14.
64.
Id.
65.
Id. at 15.
66.
Id.
67.
Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589; Act of August 6, 1861, ch. 60,
12 Stat. 319.
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smuggled goods. 68 In Armstrong's Foundry, the Court recognized that
the Acts "regarded the consent of the owner to the employment of his
property in aid of the rebellion as an offence, and inflicted forfeiture as
a penalty."69 Despite the Acts' penal nature, the Court nevertheless
upheld them as an exercise of the war power over the claimant's
objections that the Acts violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 70
citing the enactment of similar forfeiture provisions in the colonies/states
during the Revolutionary War. 71 The Court also held that due process
did not require a prior criminal conviction before forfeiture. 72
D.

The Post-Bel/um Expansion of Civil Foifeiture

The survival of the Confiscation Acts encouraged Congress to expand
in rem forfeiture beyond its traditional domain-customs and admiralty----to enforce revenue provisions unrelated to the maritime trade. 73
The landmark case upholding this break with tradition is Dobbins 's
Distillery v. United States. 74 In Dobbins 's Distillery, the Court upheld

68. Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. {I I Wall.) 331, 345 (1870); Union Ins. Co. v.
United States, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 759, 764 (1867).
69.
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 766, 769 (1867) (holding that a presidential amnesty
relieved an ex-Confederate ofa prior forfeiture). The Acts' legislative history reinforces
its penal nature. See Maxeiner, supra note 37, at 786-87 (discussing Congress's
intention to punish rebels). The Court construed the Acts narrowly to avoid offending
the Corruption of Blood clause. See Bigelow v. Forrest, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 339, 352
(1870).
70. Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268,305 (1871). The Court stated:
The Constitution confers upon Congress expressly power to declare war ...
and make rules respecting captures on land and water. Upon the exercise of
these powers no restrictions are imposed. Of course the power to declare war
... includes the right to seize and confiscate all property of an enemy and to
dispose of it at the will of the captor.
Id.
71. Miller, 78 U.S. at 312. See, e.g., Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) I 73 (1809) (upholding forfeiture of real property under a New Jersey treason
statute). The Miller decision provoked a heated dissent from Justice Field. In his view,
legislation founded upon the municipal power of the government and directed
against criminals . . . is subject to all the limitations prescribed by the
Constitution for the protection of the citizen against hasty and indiscriminate
accusation, and which insure to him, when accused, a speedy and public trial
by a jury of his peers.
78 U.S. at 315.
72. See Tyler, 78 U.S. at 337-38, 346.
73. See Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, 15 Stat. 125, 133.
74. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
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the forfeiture of a distillery, and the real property upon which it stood,
for liquor-tax violations. The owner had leased the property, and his
tenant had defrauded the government of excise taxes due on the liquor
distilled there. 75 It was not necessary, the Court held, "that the owner
of the property should have knowledge that the [tenant] was committing
fraud on the public revenue, in order that the information of forfeiture
should be maintained." 76 The Court reasoned that the proceeding was
civil in nature, and that any "conviction of the wrong-doer must be
obtained, if at all, in another and wholly independent proceeding."77
The Court justified its holding by citing The Palmyra. 78 No precedent
was cited, however, for the proposition that real property forfeiture, as
opposed to the personal property traditionally forfeited in rem, could be
accomplished without a prior criminal conviction. Nowhere in the
decision does the Court indicate that it even considered whether real
property was distinguishable from personal property. The Court simply
affirmed the forfeiture despite the owner's lack of wrong-doing because
"the offence . . . attached primarily to the distillery, and the real and
personal property used in connection with the same, without any regard
whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner. "79

Dobbins s Distillery did not end challenges to civil forfeiture. Faced
with those challenges, the Court shied away from the full implications
of forfeiture's "civil" label. In Coffey v. United States, the Court held
that a prior acquittal of criminal tax evasion barred a subsequent civil
forfeiture based on the same conduct. 80 Later that same term, in Boyd
v. United States, the Court held that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
barred the compulsory production of private documents in a forfeiture
proceeding.81 The Court declared the proceedings "quasi-criminal,"

75. Id. at 396-97.
76.
Id. at 399.
77.
Id.
78.
Id. at 399-400.
79.
Id. at 401. The Court also affirmed the relation-back principle in the context
of real property. United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 17 (1890) ("[T]he forfeiture
constitutes a statutory transfer of the right to the United States at the time the offence
is committed; and the condemnation, when obtained, relates back to that time, and
avoids all intermediate sales and alienations, even to purchasers in good faith."). In a
later case involving personal property forfeiture, the Court rejected the claimant's
argument that the government could not seize property unless it proved its case beyond
a reasonable doubt. Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237, 266-68, 271-72
(1878). The Court had earlier reaffirmed that where a seizure giving rise to a forfeiture
was made on land, the claimant was entitled to a jury trial. Gamharts v. United States,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 162, 165 (1872).
80.
I 16 U.S. 436,442 (1886).
81.
I 16 U.S. 616 (1886).
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because proceedings for "the forfeiture of a man's property by reasons
of offences committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in
their nature criminal. " 82
These pronouncements spawned a series of constitutional challenges
to civil forfeiture, but the Court narrowly cabined Boyd's "quasicriminal" rationale. The Court reaffirmed the traditional rule requiring
no prior criminal conviction to forfeit unlawfully imported goods, 83 and
denied that Confrontation Clause rights attach in forfeiture proceedings.84 The Court made no pretense of distinguishing Boyd; it simply
announced that "[t]he principles announced in the Boyd case have no
application whatever to the present case" because there was no claim of
either unreasonable search and seizure or compelled self-incrimination.85
This disdain for Boyd's reasoning did not bode well for future
challenges to forfeiture. The Court later held that the trial judge could
direct a verdict for the government in a forfeiture suit, 86 and that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt was not required, even though the statute
authorizing the penalty also made the same conduct a misdemeanor. 87
Finally, the Court breezily rejected the due process challenge of an
innocent third-party claimant, holding a security interest in a car
forfeited for transporting alcohol, who challenged in rem forfeiture: 88
Congress interposes the care and responsibility of their owners in aid of the
prohibitions of the law and its punitive provisions, by ascribing to the property
a certain personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the wrong....
But whether the reason for [civil forfeiture] be artificial or real, it is too
firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now
displaced. 89

82.
Id. at 633-34.
83. Origet v. United States, 125 U.S. 240 (1888).
84. United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1896).
85.
Id. at 480.
86.
Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 112 (1909).
87.
United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914). The Court distinguished Boyd
on the ground that the Fifth Amendment had a "broader scope" than did the Sixth. Id.
at 50.
88. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 506, 509
(1921).
89.
Id. at 510-11. After Prohibition's repeal, the Court stepped back from the
rather daunting monitoring duties it had imposed on creditors. See United States v. One
1936 Model Ford V-8 DeLuxe Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 236 (1939) ("The forfeiture acts
... were intended for protection of the revenues, not to punish without fault.").
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Apparently, civil forfeiture was too well embedded in tradition to be
dislodged by mere appeals to fairness.

E.

Modern Civil Foifeiture Cases

Constitutional challenges to forfeiture declined after Prohibition, 90 but
the modem Court has revisited civil forfeiture's constitutional status. In
United States v. United States Coin & Currency, the Court held that the
right against compelled self-incrimination provided a defense to the civil
forfeiture of money used in illegal gambling, rejecting the government's
argument that it was prosecuting the money, not the gambler. 91 The
Court reasoned:
From the relevant constitutional standpoint there is no difference between a man
who "forfeits" $8,674 because he has used the money in illegal gambling
activities and a man who pays a "criminal fine" of $8,674 as a result of the
same course of conduct. ... When the forfeiture statutes are viewed in their
entirety, it is manifest that they are intended to impose a penalty only upon
those who are significantly involved in a criminal enterprise. 92

The Court, however, quickly dispelled any notion that it would apply
criminal procedures to civil forfeiture across the board. Two terms later,
the Court rejected a double jeopardy challenge to the forfeiture of
smuggled goods. 93 The Court found the forfeiture remedial, because
it "prevents forbidden merchandise from circulating in the United States,
and . . . it provides a reasonable form of liquidated damages for

90. The Court decided a number of forfeiture cases during Prohibition. The
National Prohibition Act provided for forfeiture only after a criminal conviction, but
Congress did not repeal the alcohol excise tax, or its broad forfeiture provisions. United
States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U.S. 321, 326-27, 332 (1926). The Court upheld the
tax's forfeiture provisions, although there was "no way in which the tax could be ...
paid." Id. at 327. A tax which was actually a penalty could not be obtained after a
criminal conviction. United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931). But see
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 39 I (1938) (50% tax penalty is remedial and therefore
no double jeopardy bar to civil collection proceeding following criminal acquittal). But
forfeiture was not a penalty, because "[i]t is the property which is proceeded against,
and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious
instead of inanimate and insentient." Various Items of Personal Property v. United
States, 282 U.S. 577,581 (1931). See also Helvering, 303 U.S. at 400 ("Forfeiture of
goods ... [hasJ been recognized as enforceable by civil proceedings since the original
revenue law of I 789. In spite of [its] comparative severity, [forfeiture has] been upheld
against the contention that [it is] essentially criminal and subject to the procedural rules
governing criminal prosecutions." (citations omitted)).
91.
401 U.S. 715, 720 (1971).
92.
Id. at 718, 721-22.
93.
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (I 972) (per
curiam).
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violation of the inspection prov1s1ons and serves to reimburse the
Government for investigation and enforcement expenses."94
The next term brought an even more emphatic rejection of challenges
to civil forfeiture. In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., the
Court upheld a yacht's forfeiture, resulting from the discovery of
marijuana on board, over the lessor's objection that it was ignorant of
the yacht's illegal use. 95 The lessor claimed that the forfeiture violated
due process and was a taking without just compensation. The Court
offered three reasons for rejecting the lessor's claim to preseizure notice
and a hearing: ( l) seizure permitted in rem jurisdiction, "thereby
fostering the public interest in preventing continued illicit use of the
property and in enforcing criminal sanctions"; 96 (2) preseizure notice
might lead to the removal, concealment, or destruction of the property;
and (3) the seizure was initiated by government officials rather than
"self-interested private parties."97 The Court also rejected the takings
claim, invoking the long history of civil and criminal forfeiture
provisions, as well as the need to help enforce the criminal law.
Forfeiture ensured that the conveyance would not be used again for
illegal activity, "and ... impos[ed] an economic penalty, thereby
rendering illegal behavior unprofitable."98 The owner's innocence was
irrelevant, because the forfeiture would "induc[e] them to exercise
greater care in transferring possession of their property."99 The Court
did not explain how the owners might have done so.
F.

Recent Cases

More recently, the Court has revealed a heightened skepticism of civil
forfeiture's role in the war on drugs. The government recently has
94. Id. at 237. Coffey and Boyd were limited to their facts. Id. at 235 n.5, 236
n.6. Coffey subsequently was overruled. United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984) ("[N]either collateral estoppel nor double jeopardy
bars a civil, remedial forfeiture proceeding initiated following an acquittal on related
criminal charges. To the extent that Coffey v. United States suggests otherwise, it is
hereby disapproved."); see also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,253 (1980) ("This
Court has declined, however, to give full scope to the reasoning and dicta in Boyd .

. . .").

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

416 U.S. 663 (1974).
Id. at 679.
Id.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 688.
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litigated four civil forfeiture cases arising under the Drug Act; it lost all
four. 100 We focus on the last two cases. 101
In Austin v. United States, the government sought civil forfeiture of
Richard Austin's mobile home and auto body shop after he was
convicted for distributing two ounces of cocaine from the shop, having
brought the cocaine from his mobile home to consummate a prearranged
sale. 102 The district court granted the government's summary judgment
motion, rejecting Austin's argument that the forfeiture violated the
Excessive Fines Clause, and the court of appeals "reluctantly" affirmed. io3 The Supreme Court granted Austin's certiorari petition.i 04
The government urged that "any claim that the government's conduct
in a civil proceeding is limited by ... the Excessive Fines Clause ...
must fail unless the challenged governmental action, despite its label,
would have been recognized as a criminal punishment at the time the
Eighth Amendment was adopted." 105 Arguing that civil forfeiture of
real property was not criminal punishment, the government invoked the
venerable traditions of deodand and the revenue laws which treated the
100.
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993);
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993); United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave.,
113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) (plurality opinion); Republic Nat'! Bank of Miami v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 554 (1992). In a fifth case, the Court rejected a First Amendment
challenge to a RICO criminal forfeiture, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), but remanded to the lower
court for consideration of the defendant's Excessive Fines challenge. Alexander v.
United States, I I 3 S. Ct. 2766, 2769 (I 993). As this Article goes to print, two
additional cases are pending before the Court. See infra notes 150, 153.
IO I.
In Republic Nat'/ Bank, the government argued that the court of appeals lost
jurisdiction when the United States Marshal transferred the proceeds from the sale of the
res to the Assets Forfeiture Fund. 113 S. Ct. at 557. The Court disagreed, limiting the
rule of The Brig Ann requiring the seizure of the res, see supra note 62, to those cases
in which the seizing party had abandoned its attachment prior to filing an action. 113
S. Ct. at 559. The Court explained the rationale allowing jurisdiction on the basis of
seizure: "The fictions of in rem forfeiture were developed primarily to expand the reach
of the courts and to furnish remedies for aggrieved parties," and explained the limits of
that rule: to ensure "enforceability of judgments, and fairness of notice to parties." Id.
(citations omitted).
In 92 Buena Vista Ave., the government argued that an allegedly innocent owner had
no property right because title "related back" to vest in the government at the time of
the purchase, which was made with drug trafficking proceeds. I I3 S. Ct. at I 130. In
the government's view, the proceeds had been forfeited prior to those transactions, and
any subsequent transfer did not devest the government's title. Id. at 1134. The Court
rejected this "absurdity" because "the Government's submission would effectively
eliminate the innocent owner defense in almost every imaginable case." Id. at I 135 &
n.18. The Court held that title did not vest in the government until judgment, and that
claimants could therefore assert the statutory defenses. Id. at 1136.
I 02.
113 S. Ct. at 2803.
103.
Id.
104.
113 S. Ct. 1036.
105.
Brief for the United States at 16, Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801
(1993) (No. 92-6073).
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property as the offender. 106 The government, however, failed to cite
any case before Dobbins s Distillery in which a court-English or
American--treated real property as the offender. The following
exchange occurred at oral argument:
[Justice Scalia]: Mr. Estrada, historically-do you know the answer to this?
Historically at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted, was there such a
thing as in rem forfeiture of real property, or was it limited to ships and
personal property?
MR. ESTRADA: [T]here is no contemporary case that we've been able to
find in which a specific issue was made of the fact. There is a case, Dobbins
Distillery, which is cited in our [brief], in which the claim was raised
specifically that real property in that case could not be forfeited, and the Court
dealt with real property in the case much as it had dealt with the claims of ships
and the like without giving any indication whatsoever that the real estate, by
virtue of bein§ that type of property interest, couldn't be forfeited under the
common law. 1 7

s

"[A]t the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted," real property could
only have been forfeited as a criminal punishment. 108

I 06.
Id. at 18-24.
107.
Official Transcript at 26-27, Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993)
(No. 92-6073).
I 08.
Justice Kennedy later distinguished the common law tradition relied on by the
government:
[Justice Kennedy]: But all that analysis, Mr. Estrada, proceeds from the line
of cases that essentially began with forfeitures in the maritime area and
forfeitures of certain kind of chattel. But isn't it true that at early common
law, one of the benefits, at least to the nobles, of classifying certain crimes as
felony was so that they could have forfeiture. Forfeiture was intricately bound
up with the definition of crime at a very early English law, was it not?
MR. ESTRADA: Well, I think[Justice Kennedy]: And didn't the Framers recognize that?
MR. ESTRADA: There were two types of forfeiture at early common law,
Justice Kennedy. One of them was the so-called forfeiture of estate, which
really was in personam and really only came into play when the Government
proved with a judgment of conviction that the person had, in fact, been
convicted of a crime.
The other type of forfeiture really didn't have anything to do with the crimes
that were hurting the king's bench. It was in a completely different court
system, the Court of the Exchequer, and that type of forfeiture, which is, in
essence, what is at issue here, didn't partake of the rationale that you just gave
I think.
[Justice Kennedy]: It seems to me that the Framers were concerned that the
criminal laws not be used to impose excessive punishments, and certainly in
the early history of England, that was true with reference to forfeitures for
felonies.

105

Apart from these vexing questions regarding the historical tradition of
real property forfeiture, the government also labored to distinguish
United States v. Halper. 109 The Court in Halper held that double
jeopardy barred a proceeding to seek a civil penalty, disproportionate to
any remedial end, subsequent to a criminal conviction. The government
argued in Austin that the forfeiture of Austin's property served a broad
remedial purpose:
The drain on the public fisc attributable to the vastly increased law enforcement
expenses that have accompanied the drug epidemic, and to the care, treatment,
and rehabilitation of drug addiction and related problems is practically
incalculable----and easily dwarfs the value of assets acquired by the government
as a result of asset forfeitures. 110

The Court unanimously reversed. 111 After surveying English and
American forfeiture history, the Court found that "forfeiture generally
and statutory in rem forfeiture in particular historically have been
understood, at least in part, as punishment." 112 The Court rejected the
government's argument that forfeiture under the Drug Act was remedial,
focusing on: (1) the Act's provisions protecting innocent owners; (2)
Congress's choice "to tie forfeiture directly to the commission of drug
offenses"; and (3) "the dramatic variations in the value of conveyances
and real property forfeitable." 113 The Court concluded that forfeiture
was a "'payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense' ...

MR. ESTRADA: Right, but it was not the same type of forfeiture that is at
issue here, Justice Kennedy. If this were a case in which the forfeiture could
only be had upon the conviction of a crime, we don't-we would not be here
because we would concede that the essence of that sort of action is on the
person.
What we do have here is a statute that really doesn't need the criminal law
other than to state a--other than to set a standard of conduct and, taking that
as the standard of conduct, then says if your property has been used or is
intended to be used for this purpose, then we will make sure that that harm
doesn't come to pass by placing the property in the hands of someone who can
give surety to society as a whole that these harms won't happen. And I think
that's a very different type of forfeiture than the forfeiture that you have in
mind, Justice Kennedy.
Id. at 39-41 (emphasis added). The authors are grateful to Miguel Estrada for
identifying the justices posing the cited questions. Interview with Miguel A. Estrada,
Assistant to the Solicitor General (Apr. I, 1994).
109.
490 U.S. 435 (1989).
110.
Brief for the United States at 30-31, Austin v. United States, I 13 S. Ct. 2801
{1993) (No. 92-6073) (citations omitted).
111.
Austin, I 13 S. Ct. at 2812.
112.
Id. at 2810.
113.
Id. at 2810-12.
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subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause." 114
The Supreme Court addressed civil forfeiture only once during the
following term. 115 Four years after James Daniel Good had been
convicted, sentenced, and fined in a Hawaii state court for growing
marijuana, the United States filed an in rem action to forfeit his house
and the appurtenant four acres. 116 Based on an affidavit stating the
facts underlying the state conviction, the magistrate judge issued an ex
parte warrant to seize the property. 117 After the seizure, Good filed a
claim for the property's return. 118 The district court entered a judgment of forfeiture, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the
government violated due process when it seized Good's property without
prior notice and hearing. 119
The government argued that the Due Process Clause did not apply
when seizing property for "law enforcement purposes," and that it only
needed to comply with the Fourth Amendment. 120 The government
reasoned that because the Fourth Amendment did not require an
adversary hearing to establish probable cause to detain a criminal
defendant pending trial, no adversary hearing was required to detain real
property subject to forfeiture. 121 In the alternative, the government
urged that due process did not require notice and a hearing before
seizing property for forfeiture. 122 As in Austin, the government cited

114. Id. at 2812 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257,
265 (1989).
115. See Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994)
(expanding upon the Halper analysis in the context of taxation of illegal drugs).
116. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 497
( I 993). Although A. C. Pritchard was employed by the Office of the Solicitor General
at the time Good was argued, the views expressed here are solely those of the authors
and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Justice.
117.
Id.
118.
Id. at 498.
119.
Id.
120.
Brief for the United States at 13, United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993) (No. 92-1180).
121. Id. at 9 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119-22 (1975)).
122. Id. at 10 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
677 (I 974)).
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no case prior to Dobbins sDistillery in which real property was forfeited
in rem. 123
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, rejected the government's
argument that the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to civil
forfeitures excluded the application of the Due Process Clause. 124 He
applied the balancing test of Matthews v. Eldridge 125 to the facts of the
case. Justice Kennedy found that: (1) Good had a substantial interest
in his home; (2) the ex parte determination of probable cause posed a
considerable risk of error; and (3) the government's asserted interests in
taking control of the property---obtaining jurisdiction and preventing the
loss or destruction of the property-were slight in the case of real
property. 126 He distinguished Dobbins s Distillery and later cases on
the ground that "executive urgency" required "'[t]he prompt payment
of taxes. "' 127 Because tax revenues were not implicated, due process
required notice and hearing before seizing the house. 128
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas
dissented. The Chief Justice characterized the distinction of Dobbins s
Distillery as "novel," and pointed out that the majority's opinion called
into question the government's long-established authority to collect taxes
by summary procedures. 129 Justice O'Connor charged that "[t]he
distinction the Court tries to draw between our precedents and this
case---the only distinction it can draw-is that real property is somehow
different than personal property for due process purposes. But that
distinction has never been considered constitutionally relevant in our
forfeiture cases." 130 Justice O'Connor cited Dobbins s Distillery for
the proposition that the government can summarily seize and forfeit real
property used in a crime. 131 Justice Thomas's dissent was more
guarded in its tone, recognizing that

123.
Id. at 18. The ACLU, as amicus, focused on civil forfeiture's expansion
beyond its original domain of contraband and direct instrumentalities. Brief Amicus
Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Hawaii in Support of
Respondents at 3-IO. The ACLU urged that "civil in rem forfeiture is no longer
grounded in its original remedial justification," and that "the government can no longer
rely on the 'guilty property' fiction to obscure the punitive impact of forfeiture on
individuals like Good." Id. at 10. In the ACLU's view, property owners were entitled
to all relevant constitutional criminal procedures. Id. at 19.
124.
Good, 114 S. Ct. at 500.
125.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
126.
Good, 114 S. Ct. at 50 I.
127.
Id. at 504 (quoting Springer v. United States, l02 U.S. 586, 594 (1880)).
128.
Id. at 505.
129.
Id. at 509 (Rehnquist, C.J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130.
Id. at 511 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
131.
Id. at 512.
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[a] strong argument can be made ... that§ 881(a)(7) is so broad that it differs
not only in degree, but in kind, from its historical antecedents.... Given that
current practice under § 88l(a)(7) appears to be far removed from the legal
fiction upon which the civil forfeiture doctrine is based, it may be necessary-in an appropriate cas~o reevaluate our genera11 deferential approach
to legislative judgments in this area of civil forfeiture. 131

In Justice Thomas' view, however, Good did not provide an appropriate
vehicle for reconsidering the Court's approach to civil forfeiture. Justice
Thomas found the majority's distinction of Dobbins s Distillery "twicepuzzling," as it was "somewhat odd that the ... Government's financial
concerns might justifiably control the due process analysis" and "difficult
to believe that the prompt collection of funds was more essential to the
Government a century ago than it is today." 133
Ill.

CIVIL FORFEITURE, THE COURT, AND THE CONSTITUTION

The Constitution, with enforcement by Article Ill's independent
judiciary, limits the agency costs that government actors can impose on
the public. 134 Judicial independence protects judges from political
pressures----such as those compelling legislators to enact ever more
draconian laws against drug trafficking--and allows the judiciary to
check the rent-seeking behavior endemic to the political branches. 135
As shown in Part I, agency costs are particularly acute in the context of
the war on drugs, especially given civil forfeiture's collateral consequences in violence and property crime. In our view, civil forfeiture has
more to do with rent-seeking by legislators and law enforcement officials
than with eradicating drug use. In this Part, we discuss the judiciary's
role in discouraging this rent-seeking.
Drug Act forfeiture singles out certain individuals to bear the costs of
law enforcement against illegal drug use. Imposing costs on a particular

132.
Id. at 515 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133.
Id. at 516.
134.
Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An
Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111,
123-29 (1993).
135.
Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Reassessing the Role of the
Independent Judiciary in Enforcing Interest-Group Bargains, 5 CONST. POL. ECON. I
(1994).
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industry ordinarily does not run foul of takings law, 136 but civil
forfeiture imposes costs on only a part of the industry. As a consequence of drug criminalization, civil forfeiture singles out those
individuals who have been caught drug trafficking, and those unlucky or
foolish enough to permit dealers to use their property. The Takings
Clause ordinarily would require compensation in such cases, because it
"bar[s] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole." 137 The Court, however, has rejected takings challenges
to forfeitures on the ground that forfeiture "further[s] the punitive and
deterrent purposes that have been found sufficient to uphold, against
constitutional challenge, the application of ... forfeiture statutes to the
property of innocents." 138
This reasoning makes sense for criminal forfeiture, which explicitly
punishes. The criminal law singles out individuals for punishment based
on their behavior. Constitutional criminal procedure exists because
legislatures are unlikely to supply optimal procedures for correctly
singling out individuals who have committed crimes. Courts must step
in to ensure adequate procedures. 139 The due process ideal that
criminals should be precisely identified appeals to common notions of
corrective justice, as well as efficiency concerns of optimal deterrence.
Simply put, more precise criminal law enforcement yields greater
deterrence of wrongdoers with fewer collateral costs imposed on
innocents.
Takings law provides a useful analogy to help explain why the
Constitution mandates criminal procedures in certain contexts. Just as
the requirement of just compensation forces government to internalize
the costs of highways by imposing that cost on taxpayers as a whole,
channeling crime fighting through the criminal process, and funding that

136.
See Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. R.Ev.
1333, 1347 (1991) ("regulatory plans that burden entire industries (such as legislation
mandating automobile safety equipment or banning the sale of alcohol) are not
compensable takings").
137.
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
138.
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974)
(emphasis added). The Court had earlier suggested that taking the property of "totally
innocent people" would raise "serious constitutional questions" under the Takings
Clause. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719-20 (1971).
As this Article was going to print, however, the Court handed down its decision in
Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (March 4, 1996), rejecting a challenge brought by
an innocent owner. We discuss that decision and the historical treatment of innocent
owners in a forthcoming article. See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Innocence
Lost: Bennis v. Michigan and the Forfeiture Tradition, Mo. L. REV. (forthcoming
1996).
139. See Pritchard, supra note 14, at 1069-74.
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process through the general revenues, forces taxpayers to internalize the
full social cost of criminalization and increases government accountability. Criminal forfeiture, while not immune from rent-seeking abuses by
government officials, reduces externality problems. 14° Criminal
forfeiture, like a criminal fine, is unambiguously subject to both the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, and the Sixth
Amendment's right of trial by jury. 141 In addition, requiring government to proceed criminally when it seeks forfeiture reduces prosecutors'
bargaining power because they cannot trade criminal immunity for the
turnover of assets. The revenue potential of forfeiture would be
curtailed by the requirement of a criminal conviction, and politicians and
law enforcement authorities would feel the full budgetary implications
of a drug war. More importantly, criminal forfeiture affords defendants
the accuracy-enhancing criminal process which protects against
erroneous singling out of the innocent.
Criminal forfeiture has other advantages. Civil forfeiture ties agency
revenues to criminal behavior, presenting a unique opportunity for law
enforcement abuse, which is absent when civil forfeiture is used in a
legal industry. For example, when the Food and Drug Administration
seizes misbranded or defective drugs from a pharmaceutical company,
the company is part of a lobby that can push Congress for changes in
forfeiture enforcement if the FDA abuses its authority. Under the Drug
Act, however, Congress has criminalized the behavior giving rise to the
forfeiture, leaving no lobby to campaign for reform. Because few bear
the burden of forfeiture, and Congress has effectively disenfranchised
those individuals from the interest group lobbying that produces
legislation, the heightened protection of criminal procedures is needed.
Abuses left unchecked by the courts will go unchecked altogether.
Although the judiciary has an important role to play in cabining civil
forfeiture, perceived abuse does not warrant judicial conjuring of novel
constitutional doctrines. Justice Scalia noted such a trend in the Court's
Austin decision.
We have never held that the Constitution requires negligence, or any other
degree of culpability, to support such forfeitures .... If the Court is correct that

140.
For a discussion of criminal forfeiture's revival, see Karla R. Spaulding, "Hit
Them Where it Hurts": RICO Criminal Forfeitures and White Collar Crime, 80 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY I 97, I 98-211 (1989).
141.
See Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2769 (1993).
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culpability of the owner is essential, then there is no difference (except perhaps
the burden of proof) between the traditional in rem forfeiture and the traditional
in personam forfeiture. Well-established common-law distinctions should not
be swept away by reliance on bits of dicta. 142

We share Justice Scalia's desire to maintain "[w]ell-established commonlaw distinctions." Indeed, given the rent-seeking abuses identified in
Part I, we believe that the Court should restore the "common-law
distinctions" that served to protect liberty.
In this Part, we criticize the Court's approach to curbing civil
forfeiture abuses. We then sketch an alternative constitutional framework for answering civil forfeiture questions. Our framework restores
"common-law distinctions" and finds support in both economics and
history. In our view, the Court went astray when it discarded the
common-law distinction between personal property, which was subject
to in rem forfeiture, and real property forfeiture, which required an in
personam criminal conviction. That distinction is crucial to any coherent
civil forfeiture doctrine. Furthermore, our rule would permit the
government to proceed in rem--unconstrained by the Bill of Rights
provisions traditionally applied only in criminal proceedings--only
against personal property. In order to obtain real property through
forfeiture, the government would first have to criminally convict the
property owner in personam.
A.

Defects of the Current Constitutional Regime

The government's expansion of civil forfeiture has left the Court in a
doctrinal quagmire. Beginning with Boyd, the Court has confronted civil
forfeiture abuses using a "selective incorporation" approach, extending
some, but not all, criminal constitutional protections to civil forfeiture. 143 The Court, however, has done so in a grudging and haphazard
fashion, without explaining why certain protections have been extended
while others have not. 144 Boyd invoked Fourth and Fifth Amendment
protections ordinarily limited to criminal proceedings based on the

142.
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2814 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
143.
Compare Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (Black, J.,
concurring) (advocating total incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth
Amendment) with id. at 176 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's ad hoc
"selective incorporation").
144.
See, e.g., Austin v. United States, I 13 S. Ct. 2801, 2804-05 n.4 (1993); United
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,248 (1980); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,400 n.3
(I 937); see also Schecter, supra note 34, at 1157-78 (criticizing selective application of
criminal constitutional provisions to forfeitures and advocating criminal procedures for
all proceedings under the Drug Act).
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Court's conclusion that the forfeiture was "quasi-criminal." No guidance
was offered, however, in determining what other constitutional provisions would be required by "quasi-criminal" forfeiture. 145 Unable to
formulate a limiting principle for the "quasi-criminal" category, the
Court simply ignored it when confronted with other constitutional
claims.
Faced with the forfeiture abuses of the Drug Act, the contemporary
Court has continued Boyd's tradition of checking abuse by invoking
constitutional provisions on an ad hoc basis. In Austin, the Court used
an amorphous remedial/punitive standard for determining when the
protections of the Eighth Amendment, ordinarily limited to criminal
cases, 146 should be brought to bear in a civil proceeding. 147 Traditional constitutional standards, however, allow the government to punish
only after a criminal conviction. 148 If the forfeiture "punished" Austin
in a constitutional sense, no forfeiture of any amount should have been
permitted absent a criminal conviction. Austin, of course, had already
faced prosecution criminally, so double jeopardy would have barred a
criminal forfeiture prosecution. Austin not only departed from traditional
notions of punishment, but it also requires a case-by-case analysis with
an involved factual accounting of a forfeited property's value relative to
the harm suffered by the government. Austin followed Halper, in which
the Court offhandedly dismissed the traditional dividing line between
civil and criminal protections: "The notion of punishment, as we
commonly understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and

I 45.
Cf. J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A
Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 414 (1976) ("[Boyd's]
term 'quasi-criminal,' ... has muddied legal waters ever since.").
146.
Ex parte Watkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568, 573-74 (1833) ("The eighth
amendment is addressed to courts ... exercising criminal jurisdiction .... ").
147.
See supra notes I 02-14 and accompanying text.
148. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n.40 (1977). The Court stated:
Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied
with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal
prosecutions.... [T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with which
the Eight Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law. Where the State
seeks to impose punishment without such an adjudication, the pertinent
constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id.
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the criminal law." 149 The Court's reliance on Halper in Austin suggests that the Court will extend the remedial/punitive analysis when
assessing double jeopardy challenges to civil forfeitures, further blurring
the line between civil and criminal constitutional procedures.
The Court's decisions in this area have led to confusion in the lower
courts. The Ninth Circuit has recently held that forfeiture under the
Drug Act always constitutes punishment, 150 reading the Court's
decision in Austin: "[to] resolve[] the 'punishment' issue with respect to
forfeiture cases for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause as well as
the Excessive Fines Clause. In short, if a forfeiture constitutes
punishment under the Halper criteria, it constitutes 'punishment' for the
purposes of both clauses." 151 Looking "to the requirements of the
forfeiture statute as a whole," the Ninth Circuit concluded that Drug Act
forfeitures operated "at least in part to punish and deter." 152 Accordingly, any civil forfeiture under the Drug Act subsequent to criminal
conviction was barred by double jeopardy. 153
We disagree with the courts that have read Austin to hold that double
jeopardy should apply generally to civil forfeitures. To determine if the
defendant is being punished twice, Halper requires ad hoc balancing of
the government's damages relative to the forfeited property's value. 154
Sanctioning conduct both criminally and civilly, however, has long been
held constitutional. 155 Double jeopardy provides the wrong constitutional framework for tackling the disproportionality problems raised by
civil forfeiture. If a penalty genuinely punishes, its constitutionality
should not tum on whether it is imposed before, after, or simultaneously

149.
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989).
150. See United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. granted, United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996), argued April 17,
1996. This decision has led to chaos in the district courts of the Ninth Circuit. See
generally Joan L. Cobb, Forfeiture Decision Generates Veritable Explosion of Relief, 8
BNA CRJM. PRAC. MAN. 590 (I 994).
151.
$405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1219.
152.
Id. at 1220-2 I.
153.
Id. at 1222; accord United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568,573 (6th Cir. 1995),
cert. granted, I 16 S. Ct. 762 (1996), argued April 17, 1996 ("any civil forfeiture under
21 U.S.C. § 88I(a)(7) constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes").
154.
United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295,298 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Halper . .. focuses
on the relationship between the amount of the civil sanction and the amount required to
serve the remedial purpose of reimbursing the costs incurred by the government and
society as a result of the wrongful conduct.").
155.
United States v. Dixon, 347 U.S. 381, 385 (1954) ("Clearly Congress may
impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act; this is neither
unusual nor constitutionally objectionable.").
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with criminal punishment. It should be unconstitutional unless imposed
in a criminal proceeding. 156 Due process accuracy requires no less.
In applying double jeopardy to civil forfeitures, the Court further
confuses the question of when criminal constitutional procedures will
apply in civil proceedings. 157 Prior criminal punishment should not
bar the government from subsequently taking away the instrumentalities
by which a criminal might commit future crimes. By the same token,
when the government seizes instrumentalities used in the drug trade, a
prior civil forfeiture should not bar subsequent prosecution if the
government later uncovers evidence warranting such prosecution. To be
sure, the government can avoid such complications by bringing its
criminal case and civil forfeiture action simultaneously, 158 but it can
do this only if it knows the scope of the defendant's wrongdoing (and
the instrumentalities employed) at the time of the initial action.
Not satisfied with invoking criminal protections on an ad hoc basis,
the Court has also invented novel civil protections. Good invoked the
civil ad hoc balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge 159 to limit government seizure of real property for forfeiture. This inquiry, however,
requires the same case-by-case analysis that makes Austin so unwieldy.
Further, Good provides no clues as to what further civil forfeiture
procedures might spring from the Mathews balancing test. 160 Finally,
it calls into question long available civil procedures, such as the

156.
See Lawrence A. Kasten, Note, Extending Constitutional Protection to Civil
Forfeitures that Exceed Rough Remedial Compensation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 194,
237 {I 99 I) ("On careful inspection, the distinction between double jeopardy and other
safeguards, especially in the forfeiture context, becomes illusory.").
157.
See Peter J. Henning, Precedents in a Vacuum: The Supreme Court Continues
to Tinker with Double Jeopardy, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. I, 67 (1993) ("The application
of Halper to civil forfeiture actions could seriously impede the government's ability to
pursue parallel civil and criminal proceedings."). But see Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional
Limits on Using Civil Remedies To Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding
and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, I 3691404 (1991) (certain constitutional criminal procedures should be applied in civil cases).
158.
Compare United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993) (no Halper
problem where civil forfeiture suit and criminal case brought in "a single prosecution")
with United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 1994)
("A forfeiture case and a criminal prosecution would constitute the same proceeding only
if they were brought in the same indictment and tried at the same time.").
159.
424 U.S. 319 (1976); see also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 442-46
{1992).
160.
See, e.g., United States v. Michelle's Lounge, 39 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 1994)
(applying Matthews to grant post-seizure hearing on probable cause to seize proceeds).
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government's ability to collect taxes through summary procedures. In
our view, such an unpredictable approach poorly checks civil forfeiture
abuses.
The Court's recent decisions have produced a mish-mash of criminal
and civil procedures. In rem civil forfeiture now sits uneasily between
the realms of criminal and civil law. A more determinate, predictable,
and rule-based approach to forfeiture is available if the Court is willing
to reconsider prior holdings and return civil forfeiture to its historical
function---and boundaries---under the common law. The next sections
outline that approach.
B.

Due Process: Civil or Criminal Procedures?

This Section addresses the application of criminal constitutional
procedures to forfeiture. Although the "Court has often stated that the
question whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or
criminal is a matter of statutory construction," 161 we think, at bottom,
that question necessarily implicates the accuracy concerns of due
process. The seminal case on due process accuracy is Murray s Lessee
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. 162 Murray s Lessee requires that
judges:
examine the constitution itself, to see whether this process be in conflict with
any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to those settled
usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statue [sic] law
of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not
to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted
on by them after the settlement of this country. 163

Under this standard, a remedy available in a civil proceeding at common
law carries the strong presumption validating its current use as a civil
remedy. But the contrary proposition does not follow; the Court has not
frozen common law requirements into the Constitution.
[A] process of law, which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due
process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and
in this country; but it by no means follows that nothing else can be due process
of law. . . . [T]o hold that such a characteristic is essential to due process of
law, would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and ... render it
incapable of progress or improvement. It would be to stamp upon our
jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and
Persians. 164

161.
162.

I 63.
164.
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United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) (citations omitted).
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
Id. at 277.
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1884).
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This is no license for legislative procedural innovation: "no change in
ancient procedure can be made which disregards those fundamental
principles, to be ascertained from time to time by judicial action, which
have relation to process of law and protect the citizen in his private
right, and guard him against the arbitrary action of government." 165
Thus, the choice between civil and criminal procedures cannot be
resolved solely by reference to common law practice. 166
To carry the analysis further, we must distinguish among the three
strands of due process. Due process has both civil and criminal
procedural elements, as well as a substantive element. The Court
balances three factors in civil due process cases:
[l J the private interest that will be affected by the official action; [2) the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
[3) the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail. 167

In Medina v. California, the Court held this balancing test inapplicable
to criminal proceedings; instead, the Court examined historical practice
to determine whether a challenged procedure "offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental." 168 In the criminal context, due process has
narrow application beyond the specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights. 169 The most conspicuous example of an independent procedure
required by due process is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 170 That

165.
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, IOI (1908). But see In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 382 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) ("For me the only correct meaning of [due
process) is that our Government must proceed according to the 'law of the land'--that
is, according to written constitutional and statutory provisions as interpreted by court
decisions.")
166.
Cf Clark, supra note 145, at 409 ("[T]he Court might find it very difficult to
determine which offenses are so serious that any punishment based on their intentional
commission, even if labeled 'civil,' should trigger constitutional safeguards. The
proliferation of statutory offenses would render any historical reference to common law
impossible in many cases." (footnotes omitted)).
167.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335 (1976).
168.
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992) (internal quotations omitted).
169.
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (I 990).
170.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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rule, however, is no ad hoc judicial innovation; it is well founded in
historical practice. 171
The Court's application of different tests in civil and criminal contexts
does not necessarily reflect a different standard; each inquiry balances
the costs and benefits of procedural schemes. 172 Each test has the
same goal: Reasonable accuracy given the severity of the threatened
sanction. 173 In the criminal context, that standard has been crystallized
in historical tradition and the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.
Case-by-case judicial balancing is unlikely to improve upon that
historical balance, proved valid by experience. In the civil context, by
contrast, Congress has demonstrated an inventiveness in creating new
offenses and procedures that has left common-law procedures far
behind. 174 The judiciary has confronted that legislative innovation with
flexibility of its own in construing the requirements of due process.
The question whether a given penalty must be enforced through civil
or criminal proceedings raises similar accuracy concerns. Unless the
judiciary grants Congress carte blanche to punish through civil procedures, courts must look beyond the label affixed by the legislature. The
doctrinal hook is supplied by the third due process strand: substantive
due process. Under substantive due process standards, the government
cannot punish an individual without first establishing his guilt in a
criminal trial. 175 However, "[n]ot every disability... amounts to
punishment." 176 In determining whether a given sanction "punishes,"
thus requiring criminal procedures, the Court applies seven factors:

171.
"Although virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt standard in
common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it as a requirement of due
process, such adherence does 'reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law
should be enforced and justice administered."' Id. at 361-62 (quoting Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968)).
172. See Cheh, supra note 157, at 135 l ("One can view the Bill of Rights itself as
a balancing of interests between the costs of procedures and the benefits they confer.
Any decision to extend procedural protections beyond tbose instances where they clearly
apply requires a similar calculation.").
173. See, e.g., Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 ("The reasonable-doubt standard ... is a
prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. ... The
accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance.").
l 74.
See Cheh, supra note 157, at 1337 ("There is almost no limit to the creativity
of Congress in thinking of ways to sanction participants in government regulated
activities.").
175.
United States v. Salemo, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987) ("general rule of
substantive due process" precludes government from inflicting punishment prior to a
criminal trial); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.17 (1979) (noting "general
principle that punishment can only follow a determination of guilt after trial or plea");
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,237 (1896) (due process requires a "judicial
trial to establish the guilt of the accused" before confiscating his or her property).
176.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 537.
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[I] whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2]
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] whether it comes
into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote
the traditional aims of punishment--,etribution and deterrence, [5] whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [7]
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned .
177

Given the number of factors, it is no surprise that the Court's decisions
applying them are unclear. 178 The application of these factors to
forfeiture, however, is tolerably clear. In the next sections we apply
these due process standards to personal and real property.
C.

Due Process: Personal Property

Historically, in rem forfeiture allowed courts to hear actions against
property owned by individuals who were beyond the courts' in personam
jurisdiction. 179 Forfeiture of vessels employed in wrong-doing carries
a sound functional justification with its long historical pedigree. In rem
procedures were essential to enforce revenue and piracy laws, given that
the vessels' owners were usually beyond the court's jurisdiction. The
government often would be left remediless if required to obtain personal
jurisdiction over the owner. The personification fiction solves this
jurisdictional dilemma: "The vessel which commits the aggression is
treated as the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which the
forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the character or
conduct of the owner." 180 Justice Story justified the fiction as arising
"from the necessity of the case, as the only adequate means of suppressing the offence or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured
party."1s1

177.
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
178.
Clark, supra note 145, at 384 ("Notwithstanding general agreement about this
core concept [of punishment], the Court's application of it to particular cases has proved
to be highly unpredictable and confusing.").
179. See supra text accompanying note 62.
180.
United States v. The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844).
181.
Id. Cf. 0.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 28 (Little, Brown, and
Company 1881) ('The ship is the only security available in dealing with foreigners, and
rather than send one's own citizens to search for a remedy abroad in strange courts, it
is easy to seize the vessel and satisfy the claim at home, leaving the foreign owners to
get their indemnity as they may be able.").
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In rem procedures were not limited to admiralty; the customs laws
also authorized the seizure on land of goods that had been illegally
imported. 182 The admiralty jurisdiction did not extend to such seizures,183 but permitting in rem procedures on land for customs
violations comports with the logic of their use in admiralty for seizing
vessels. The owner of the goods may well have been beyond the court's
in personam jurisdiction, and forfeiture was the government's only
means for collecting the tax. Moreover, the sanction imposed usually
fell within the broad range of the government's expenses resulting from
the smuggling. 184 Requiring a criminal conviction before forfeiting
smuggled goods might leave the government without any sanction
against the owner. 185 Finally, the government's entitlement to collect
taxes by seizing the property could be defeated if the goods were
removed from the jurisdiction before judgment: "revenue seizures ...
are always of personal and movable property." 186 Thus, summary

182.
See, e.g., Clifton v. United States, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 242, 243 (1846).
183.
United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 76 (1838) ("[I]n cases purely
dependent upon the locality of the act done, it is limited to the sea, and to tide waters,
as far as the tide flows; and that it does not reach beyond high water mark."). Forfeiture
proceedings for goods seized on land were authorized by Congress's "power to regulate
commerce and navigation, and to levy and collect duties." Id. at 78.
184. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,237 (1972).
The Court stated:
[The] forfeiture is intended to aid in the enforcement of tariff regulations. It
prevents forbidden merchandise from circulating in the United States, and, by
its monetary penalty, it provides a reasonable form of liquidated damages for
violation of the inspection provisions and serves to reimburse the Government
for investigation and enforcement expenses.
Id.

185.
See Origet v. United States, 125 U.S. 240,246 (1888) ("The person punished
for the offence may be an entirely different person from the owner of the merchandise,
or any person interested in it. The forfeiture of the goods of the principal can form no
part of the personal punishment of his agent."). This rule still provides the government
with greater rights against the ship and its cargo than a private party would have. See
United States v. The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 235 (1844) ("So far as
the general maritime law applies to torts or injuries committed on the high seas and
within the admiralty jurisdiction, the general rule is, not forfeiture of the offending
property; but compensation to the full extent of all damages sustained or reasom,bly
allowable, to be enforced by a proceeding therefor in rem or in personam.").
186. Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 331,348 (1870). In rem proceedings
also prevented jurisdictional conflicts. See Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
268, 294 (1870). The Miller Court stated:
In revenue and admiralty cases a seizure is undoubtedly necessary to confer
upon the court jurisdiction over the thing when the proceeding is in rem. In
most such cases the res is movable personal property, capable of actual
manucaption. Unless taken into actual possession by an officer of the court,
it might be eloigned before a decree of condemnation could be made, and thus
the decree would be ineffectual.
Id.
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search and seizure of goods imported without payment of duties,
accompanied by streamlined forfeiture procedures, protected the public
revenues from massive fraud. 187
The historical justification for in rem civil forfeiture supports the
constitutionality of at least some personal property forfeitures under the
Drug Act. 188 For example, the long tradition of civil forfeiture of
contraband 189 affirms the constitutionality of forfeiting illegal
drugs. 190
Accuracy concerns are minimal because adjudication
addresses only the good's identity. 191 The government's power to
proscribe possession of certain goods encompasses the power to destroy
the offending object. 192 The owner has not been singled out as a
lawbreaker, because his culpability is irrelevant. 193 The government
can eliminate property rights in such goods. This rationale has its limits;
the label "contraband" does not define a fixed set. Notwithstanding
these limits, proceedings for the forfeiture of contraband may be more
attenuated than those normally afforded in cases involving personal
property; the Court has properly recognized that elaborate procedures are

187.
See generally In re Platt, 19 F. Cas. 815, 816-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No.
11,212) (Blatchford, J.) (discussing history and policy of customs searches).
188.
Not all assertions of in rem jurisdiction over personal property satisfy due
process. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (striking down Delaware's "quasi
in rem" jurisdiction over stock of Delaware corporations).
189.
See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599-600 (1950)
("One of the oldest examples is the summary destruction of property without prior notice
or hearing for the protection of public health. There is no constitutional reason why
Congress in the interests of consumer protection may not extend that area of control.")
190.
See 21 U.S.C. § 881(f) (1995) (authorizing forfeiture and destruction of
controlled substances).
191.
Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 322 (1870) (Field, J.,
dissenting) ("the thing, thus subject to seizure, itself furnishes the evidence for its own
condemnation").
192.
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1924) (no property rights in
liquor).
193.
See Clark, supra note 145, at 479. Clark notes:
It seems clear that forfeiture of contraband items can be justified as regulatory
rather than punitive even apart from the formal 'property interest' idea.
Forfeiture of such items does not depend on their use to commit an illegal act,
so that the sanction of forfeiture does not apply uniquely to lawbreakers.

Id.
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unnecessary. 194
A similar rule applies to stolen and smuggled
goods. 195
The government, through civil forfeiture, can also obtain conveyances
used to transport drugs. Ships used in smuggling are within civil
forfeiture's domain. Although a closer question, automobiles and
airplanes are arguably analogous instrumentalities within that traditional
domain. 196 The risk of disproportionality usually will be small because
the value of the conveyance will not be great. Moreover, the contraband
ordinarily will be found within the conveyance, making the forfeiture
determination straightforward and minimizing accuracy concerns. The
full panoply of criminal procedures should not come into play simply
because forfeiture sanctions the possession of a criminalized good, rather
than aiding revenue collection. 197 The owners of the automobiles,
however, are likely to be within the court's in personam jurisdiction. In
light of the historical justification for civil forfeiture, the Supreme Court

194.
Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594,599 (1950) (Upholding
the forfeiture of mislabeled goods: "It is sufficient, where only property rights are
concerned, that there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing and a judicial
determination."). See also Marc B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture, Burdens of Proof and the
War on Drugs, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 274, 306 (1992) ("forfeiture statutes
aimed at per se contraband should be subjected to limited scrutiny"). The Seventh
Amendment, however, may require a jury for forfeiture of goods seized on land.
Compare Four Hundred and Forty-Three Cans of Frozen Egg Product v. United States,
226 U.S. 172 (1912) (jury trial required to forfeit impure food) with Van Oster v.
Kansas, 272 U.S. 465,469 (1926) (no jury required in state forfeiture proceeding).
I 95.
The Boyd Court stated:
The seizure of stolen goods is authorized by the common law; and the seizure
of goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue laws, or concealed to avoid the
duties payable on them, has been authorized by English statutes for at least
two centuries past; and the like seizures have been authorized by our own
revenue acts from the commencement of the government.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886). See also North American Cold
Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (I 908) (no prior hearing required to seize
and destroy unwholesome food).
196.
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286 U.S. 49, 56 (1932)
("Forfeiture of vehicles bearing smuggled goods is one of the time-honored methods
adopted by the Government for the repression of the crime of smuggling." ).
l 97.
See id. at 62 ("Courts accepting the conclusion that the customs forfeitures are
ended in respect of intoxicating liquors have been unable to extricate themselves from
the conclusion that forfeitures under the navigation acts have fallen at the same time.").
Some constitutional protections commonly applied in criminal contexts would apply to
automobiles as well, even if not applied to seizures of contraband. See, e.g., One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965) (applying Fourth
Amendment to forfeiture of car, distinguishing contraband exception: "There is nothing
even remotely criminal in possessing an automobile."). On some matters, the
requirements of due process and a criminal constitutional provision may be the same.
See, e.g., United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in
United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 564 (1983) (due process employs balancing test
used under the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial).
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could properly adopt a rule requiring the government to show that the
conveyance had crossed a jurisdictional boundary or that the owner was
beyond the court's in personamjurisdiction before the conveyance could
be forfeited civilly; otherwise, a criminal proceeding would be required.198
The forfeiture of drug trafficking proceeds 199 poses a more complicated question. Congress plainly adopted the provision to deter drug
trafficking. 20 Forfeiture statutes have traditionally "applied to stolen
goods, but they did not apply to proceeds from the sale of stolen
goods."201 The forfeiture of proceeds cannot be considered a form of
restitution because consensual transactions do not create "victims." The
forfeiture of profits from illegal drug trafficking seems nonproblematic,
given the use of disgorgement for illegal profits in the antitrust and
securities areas. The disgorgement of £rofits is nonpunitive because it
simply restores the status quo ante. 02 Profiting from an illegal
transaction falls squarely within the common-law understanding of unjust
enrichment; forfeiture of profits simply imposes a constructive trust on
that unjust enrichment. 203 The civil remedy of the constructive trust
is well known to the common law. 204 Civil forfeiture of profits merely
affords the government a civil alternative for securing its entitlement to
these monies.
The forfeiture of all proceeds raises greater concerns. It is difficult to
distinguish a forfeiture of proceeds from a 100% tax, which is arguably

°

l 98.
But see Bennis v. Michigan, l l 6 S. Ct. 994 (l 996) (forfeiture of innocent
owner's interest in car is neither a taking nor a due process violation).
199.
21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(6) (1995).
200.
Senator Sam Nunn, § 88 l(a)(6)'s sponsor, sought "a meaningful deterrent. .. .
[A]stronomical profit, is the base motivation of drug traffickers. The amendment .. .
is intended to enhance the efforts to reduce the flow of illicit drugs in the United States
by striking out against the profits from illicit drug trafficking." 124 CONG. REc. 23,055
(l 978).
201.
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, l 134 (1993); id. at
l l 35 ("[W]e are not aware of any common-law precedent for treating proceeds traceable
to an unlawful exchange as a fictional wrongdoer .... ").
202.
See S.E.C. v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (disgorgement of
"ill-gotten gains" does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes).
203.
See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam) (imposing
constructive trust on profits from book published by ex-CIA agent in violation of
contractual commitment).
204.
E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the
Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1351-69 (1985)
(discussing historical development of disgorgement principle).
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punitive. 205 Although in rem forfeiture of proceeds was unknown at
common law, we believe there are common-law analogues. The
government is arguably entitled to drug proceeds because of its superior
property right in the drugs themselves prior to the defendant's conversion of the drugs into cash. 206 On this view, proceeds forfeiture is
simply a form of tracing. In some cases, the government has seized
proceeds or frozen accounts. When the claimant to those funds then
comes into court seeking equity, a court can properly deny relief based
on the claimant's "unclean hands." Civil forfeiture of proceeds simply
reduces this venerable equitable doctrine to a rule of law, but the
question is a close one. 207 The labelling of drugs as "contraband" is
simply a device by which the government seeks to control crime; 208
the validity of the tracing rationale is dependent on the strength of the
government's property right in the drugs. 209
A less formalistic rationale for the forfeiture of drug proceeds can be
found in civil forfeiture's historic function. Money today, like ships
historically, can move easily across jurisdictional boundaries, via check,
wire transfer, or suitcase. Consequently, the money's owner may be
beyond the personal jurisdiction of United States courts. As with ships,
therefore, imposing stringent monitoring duties on owners of currency
may be "the necessity of the case, as the only adequate means of
suppressing the offence or wrong."210 The civil forfeiture of proceeds
from drug trafficking fits within the historical justification for in rem
forfeiture.

205.
See Department of Revenue ofMont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994);
United States v. Lafranca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931).
206.
See Henning, supra note 157, at 65-66 ("It is unlikely that a forfeiture action
to reach the proceeds of drug transactions, as permitted under § 88l(a)(6), would be
found to be punitive because the money is a substitute for the narcotics, a byproduct of
the violation.").
207.
Compare United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1221
(9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, United States v. Ursery 116 S. Ct. 762 (1995) (distinguishing proceeds from profits) with United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295,300 (5th Cir. 1994)
(forfeiture of proceeds not punishment, because "the forfeiture of drug proceeds will
always be directly proportional to the amount of drugs sold").
208.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306 n.l l (1967). The Court stated:
[C]ontraband is indeed property in which the Government holds a superior
interest, but only because the Government decides to vest such an interest in
itself. And while there may be limits to what may be declared contraband, the
concept is hardly more than a form through which the Government seeks to
prevent and deter crime.

Id.
209.
See United States v. Private Sanitation Indus. Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc.,
44 F.3d 1082, 1085-90 (2d Cir. 1995) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (discussing RICO
disgorgement as a "quasi-criminal" sanction).
210.
United States v. The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1894).
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D.

Due Process: Real Property

The forfeiture of real property poses an even tougher constitutional
question. In Austin, the Court avoided the question of whether real
property forfeiture was a criminal punishment by extending the Eighth
Amendment to noncriminal proceedings. 211 In our view, the Court
took a wrong tum in Austin. The Court has failed, until recently, to
recognize the distinction between the forfeiture of personal property and
the forfeiture of real property. Good2 12 recognizes the distinction, but
fails to acknowledge the Court's previous errors that arose from having
ignored the distinction.
In our view, the incoherence of the Court's forfeiture doctrine stems
from Dobbins s Distillery s abandonment of the common law requirement that the government criminally convict the owner to forfeit real
property. Given the rather sparse use of real property forfeiture
subsequent to Dobbins s Distillery, the Court's abandonment of that
requirement originally did not pose great difficulties. 213 The Drug Act,
however, has greatly altered the stakes for the government, encouraging
real property forfeiture and enhancing opportunities for abuse. 214
The Court approved Congress's extension of in rem forfeiture to real
property under the Confiscation Acts without considering whether the in
rem rationale extended to real property. 215 The Court held that

211.
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806 n.6. (1993).
212.
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
213.
Real property forfeiture was rare before the Drug Act. David J. Fried,
Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 328, 384 n.257
(1988). Fried states:
[T]wo statutes ... provide for the civil forfeiture of land: land upon which
an illegal still is found, 26 U.S.C. § 5615(3) (1982); and land of a brewery
from which taxable beer has been removed for consumption or sale "with
intent to defraud the United States of the tax thereon." 26 U.S.C. § 5673
( 1982). There is no reported case of in rem forfeiture of real property under
either of these statutes more recent than United States v. About 151.682 Acres
of Land, 99 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1938).
Id.

214.
Cf id. at 331 ("Civil forfeiture is a farrago of injustices sanctified by tradition.
Its historical justifications, such as they are, have been left behind by its alarming
extension in recent years, and its adoption as a criminal punishment, when its validity
has always depended on its status as a civil penalty, is unprincipled.").
215.
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 759, 764 (1867). This
holding contradicted the Court's rejection the previous term of the argument that in rem
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Congress's war power permitted this abrogation of common-law
procedures, but the seizure could have been upheld on a basis more
consistent with the historic function of in rem jurisdiction. The
Confiscation Acts fit neatly within the traditional jurisdictional rationale
for in rem forfeiture. The owners of the property seized were ordinarily
behind Confederate Jines. To require criminal conviction before
forfeiting their real property effectively would have eliminated the
government's right to the property of culpable individuals beyond the
courts' in personam jurisdiction. The Court's rejection of such a
requirement thus squared with in rem jurisdiction's historic function.
Unfortunately, the Court extended in rem doctrine beyond its historical
function in Dobbins 's Distillery. 216
In Dobbins 's Distillery, the
jurisdictional rationale that forfeiture was necessary to collect taxes was
unavailable because the taxpayer was subject to the court's in personam
jurisdiction. 217 Moreover, the owner was also subject to in personam

procedures were available at common law. The Court overturned a state court's
assertion of in rem jurisdiction:
The action against the steamer by name, authorized by the statute of
California, is a proceeding in the nature and with the incidents of a suit in
admiralty. The distinguishing and characteristic feature of such suit is that the
vessel or thing proceeded against is itself seized and impleaded as the
defendant, and is judged and sentenced accordingly. It is this dominion of the
suit in admiralty over the vessel or thing itself which gives to the title made
under its decrees validity against all the world.
The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411,427 (1866). Moreover, the Court confirmed
the unavailability of in rem proceedings in a common law proceeding the following term.
See The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624, 644 (1868) ("[T]here is no form of action at
common law which, when compared with the proceeding in rem in the admiralty, can
be regarded as a concurrent remedy."). But see C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S.
133, 143 (1943) ("[T]here is ample support for the conclusion that in the seaboard states
forfeiture proceedings in rem, extending to seizures on navigable waters of the state,
were an established procedure of the common law courts before the Revolution.").
216.
96 U.S. 395 (1877).
217.
Moreover, the government could levy, by summary procedure, on any property
owned by the taxpayer to the extent of the tax. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land
& Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 273, 276-80 (1855) (holding that summary
seizure ofreal property for payment of taxes owing did not violate due process, because
such procedures were followed in both England and the colonies before the Revolution);
see also G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352 (1977) (no Fourth
Amendment violation in summary seizure of automobiles to satisfy tax claims); Phillips
v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595 (1931) ("The right of the United States to collect
its internal revenue by summary administrative proceedings has long been settled.");
Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880) (no due process violation in distraint and
sale of real and personal property for satisfaction of unpaid taxes). This rather draconian
levy power is justified by the need to ensure "voluntary compliance" with the tax
system. G.M. Leasing Corp., 429 U.S. at 350. Private parties, by contrast, are not
permitted such effective remedies. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (due
process violated by creditor's ex parte replevin of goods). Good calls into question the
government's power to summarily collect taxes. See United States v. James Daniel

126

[VOL. 33: 79, 1996]

Civil Forfeiture
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

jurisdiction, and therefore would have been subject to injunctive relief
to assure compliance with the law. Nonetheless, the Court discarded the
common law requirement of criminal conviction before real property
forfeiture. The Court did not acknowledge the novelty of the proceeding, nor did it consider whether the functional justifications for in rem
procedures extended to real property.
Notwithstanding Dobbins :S Distillery's novelty, the government has
attempted to establish the constitutionality of in rem forfeiture of real
property by sweeping it within the "guilty property" fiction. 218 The
"guilty property" fiction, however, cannot be sustained beyond its
original boundaries. The fiction can be traced to the ancient practice of
deodand, but that practice was questioned early: "Even Blackstone, who
is not known as a biting critic of the English legal tradition, condemned
the seizure of the property of the innocent as based upon a 'superstition'
inherited from the 'blind days' of feudalism." 219 Justice Story similarly condemned it: "deodand ... seems a peculiar case growing out of
the avarice of the church and the superstition of the layity in ancient
times."220 Whatever its status in England, "[d]eodands did not become
part of the common-law tradition of this country."221
Quite apart from deodand's rejection in America, the "guilty property"
fiction never extended to real property at English common law. The
fiction reached only personal property, which is inherently mobile;
deodand, like revenue forfeiture, never extended to real property. 222
Justice Harlan's view that "centuries ofhistory support the Government's
claim that forfeiture statutes . . . have an extraordinarily broad
scope,"223 must be limited to personal property. History does not
support the real property forfeiture upheld in Dobbins:S Distillery.

Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 509 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
218.
See, e.g., Brief for the United States, United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (!993) (No. 92-1180).
219.
United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 720-21 (1971)
(Harlan, J.) (quoting I w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, ch. 8, *300).
220.
United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch.) 398,413 (1814)
(dissenting opinion).
221.
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing, 416 U.S. 663,682 (1973). Despite
its archaic nature, deodand survived in England until 1846. Jacob J. Finkelstein, The
Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death
and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 170-71 (1973).
222.
See supra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
223.
United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. at 719.
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Although history does not support the constitutionality of in rem
forfeiture, the government has other arguments. Due process does not
limit the government to common-law procedures. The government can
devise new civil procedures, as long those procedures do not "punish"
in the constitutional sense. 224 But in our view, the forfeiture of real
property "punishes" in the constitutional sense.
Applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors, 225 we conclude that civil
forfeiture: (1) permanently restrains an owner's property interest; (2)
historically has been seen as punishment; (3) requires scienter, both
because the owner's innocence is a defense, and also in the commission
of the underlying drug offense; (4) deters persons from drug trafficking;
and (5) only applies to previously criminalized behavior. Factors (6) and
(7) are more difficult to apply. The government can easily postulate "an
alternative purpose" for civil forfeiture. The government has urged that
civil forfeiture alleviates "[t]he drain on the public fisc attributable to the
vastly increased law enforcement expenses that have accompanied the
drug epidemic, and [funds] the care, treatment, and rehabilitation of drug
addiction and related problems."226 However, by criminalizing narcotics, the government has brought the law enforcement expenses on itself.
A small percentage of forfeiture proceeds goes to treat addicts; the lion's
share goes to enforcement. 227 As to the seventh Mendoza-Martinez
factor, real property forfeiture is also frequently "excessive in relation to
the alternative purpose assigned," creating disproportionality problems
of a magnitude rarely seen in personal property cases. 228 Real property
forfeiture was an exclusively criminal remedy at common law; this civil
use of a traditionally criminal sanction places a much heavier burden on
the government to show that it does not intend to punish. Where

224.
Cf Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402 n.6 (1938) (Congress may not
provide for enforcement of punitive sanctions in civil proceedings).
225.
See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
226.
Brief for the United States at 30-31, Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 492
(1993) (No. 92-6073).
227.
In 1994, approximately one dollar in six of total federal expenditures in this
area went for treatment. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1994, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS tbl. 1.15 (1995). Forfeiture proceeds are likely to be more
heavily biased toward enforcement given typical sharing arrangements.
228.
See United States v. Sixty Acres in Etowah County, 727 F. Supp. 1414, 1422
(N.D. Ala. 1990), aff'd, 930 F.2d 857 (11th Cir. 1991). The court stated:
The United States argues that all of Texas would be forfeited under a literal
reading of§ 881 (a)(7) if Texas were owned by one person, and if one acre of
it was used in a drug deal with the owner's knowledge or consent. The larger
the tract and the smaller the portions misused, the more questionable may
become the constitutionality of a literal application of the § 881 (a)(7)
language. This court is happy not to have had to deal with this question.
Id.
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government has abandoned the common law requirement of a criminal
conviction, a presumption should arise that the government is punishing
civilly. 229
The government cannot overcome that presumption in the context of
real property forfeiture. Law enforcement is hardly a novel task for
government, and it has not shown a need for novel procedures. Even
without the civil forfeiture of real property, the government can still
criminally prosecute offenders, and enforce criminal forfeiture where the
offenders are also owners. Requiring a criminal conviction to forfeit real
property would not substantially impair the government's ability to
proscribe the property's illegal use. 230 In personam criminal forfeiture
would still permit the government to attach property subject to forfeiture
pending the outcome of the criminal proceeding. 231 The government
can also substitute property of the defendant if the defendant has hidden
property,232 and can set aside fraudulent transfers. 233 To be sure,
criminal forfeiture would bind only the defendant, not others holding a
property interest, 234 but this result would eliminate a substantial

229.
See Clark, supra note 145, at 385. Clark notes:
[I]f the law places special burdens specifically on a group of persons who have
violated some legal prohibition, then there should exist a presumption that the
law is punitive, absent convincing evidence of some other purpose. The
analysis of alternative purpose should focus on the overbreadth or underbreadth
of the legislation and on the presence or absence of a less burdensome
alternative.

Id.
230.
See Gary M. Maveal, The Unemployed Criminal Alternative in the Civil War
of Drug Forfeitures, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 45-46 (1992) (advocating advantages of
criminal forfeiture).
231.
See Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Mach. Co., 237 U.S. 303,306 (1915)
(in personam jurisdiction authorizes auxiliary attachment).
232.
See 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (1994).
233.
"The government has always possessed the implicit authority to set aside sham
or fraudulent transfers intended to avoid in rem forfeitures and enjoyed the same
authority as to inpersonam forfeitures under 1970 RICO." Fried, supra note 213, at 354
n.120 (footnotes omitted).
234.
See Rounds, 237 U.S. at 306 (in rem "decree binds all the world"; in
personam jurisdiction merely severs the personal interest of the defendant); see also The
Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1866), where the Court stated:
By the common law process, whether of mesne attachment or execution,
property is reached only through a personal defendant, and then only to the
extent of his title. Under a sale, therefore, upon a judgment in a common law
proceeding the title acquired can never be better than that possessed by the
personal defendant. It is his title, and not the property itself, which is sold.
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number of "innocent owner" questions. 235 Under an in personam
criminal regime, the government could forfeit only the defendant's
interest. 236
Even where the offender is not the owner, the government has not
shown that common law remedies are insufficient to counter the social
ill. If the government actually wishes to control an instrumentality of
crime, it can proceed civilly against the owner in a nuisance action. 237
In a nuisance action, the government could seek an injunction against
further illegal use, regardless of the owner's knowledge of prior illegal
use. The injunctive relief could be enforced through the court's
contempt power. If injunction and contempt proved ineffective, the
government could force the owner to sell the property to a party who
would ensure its lawful use. 238 It will be the rare case where the
government cannot assert in personam jurisdiction over the real
property's owner. In such a case, resort to civil forfeiture would then
be appropriate because it would be within civil forfeiture's traditional
domain.
Real property is not dangerous in and of itself; it becomes an
instrumentality of the drug trade only in the hands of a criminal
offender. 239 The government's neglect of these options suggests that

Id. at 427. See also Maxeiner, supra note 37, at 773 ("common-law forfeiture normally
took only the interest the attainted traitor or felon had in the property").
235.
Leslie C. Smith, Modem Forfeiture Law and Policy: A Proposal for Reform,
19 WM. & MARYL. REV. 661, 711 (1978) ("A forfeiture law which requires a finding
of guilty in the related criminal proceedings . . . appears desirable. The primary
constitutional objection, the forfeiture of property without due process when innocent
persons are involved, would thereby be removed, and only the offender's interest in the
property would be subject to forfeiture.").
Commentators often fret about the forfeiture of innocent owners' property. See, e.g.,
Steven L. Schwarcz & Alan E. Rothman, Civil Forfeiture: A Higher Form of
Commercial Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 287, 288 (1993); Damon G. Saltzburg, Note,
Real Property Forfeitures as a Weapon in the Government's War on Drugs: A Failure
to Protect Innocent Ownership Rights, 72 B.U. L. REV. 217, 218-19 (1992); Patricia M.
Canavan, Note, Civil Forfeiture of Real Property: The Government's Weapon Against
Drug Traffickers Injures Innocent Owners, 10 PACE L. REV. 485,486 (1990); Michael
Goldsmith & Mark J. Linderman, Asset Forfeiture and Third Party Rights: The Need
for Further Law Reform, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1254, 1256-59. We address this topic from
an historical perspective in a forthcoming article. Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note
138.
236.
Criminal forfeiture provides for notice and hearing to third party claimants.
Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277-78 (1876). The claimant, however, must
establish his interest. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) (1994).
237.
21 U.S.C. § 882 (1982).
238.
See United States v. du Pont & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 333-35 (1961) (enforcing
divestiture of stock holdings that violated Clayton Act).
239.
Stahl, supra note I 94, at 3 I 8 ("a particular building does not make it easier
to sell or store drugs and a particular piece of land does not make it easier to grow or
manufacture drugs").
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it primarily intends to punish wrongdoers and collect revenues while
evading the criminal process. Given that less restrictive and equally
efficacious alternatives are available-in addition to the practice's lack
of historical sanctioilc-------Civil forfeiture of real property violates due
process. The Court should overrule Dobbins s Distillery and require that
the government proceed criminally when seeking to forfeit real
property. 240
Due process accuracy concerns counsel a return to the common law
requirement that the government obtain a criminal conviction before
forfeiting real property. Having freed the government from common law
requirements, the Court has been unable to rely on that common law
baseline in confronting the subsequent abuses that followed as the
government expanded civil forfeiture. Absent a showing by the
government that the common law framework cannot handle modem
conditions, the Court should return to that framework. Requiring a
criminal conviction would go far toward ensuring that the real property
owner has been properly singled out for violating the drug laws because
it would necessarily invoke the procedural protections that ordinarily
accompany criminal prosecutions. The abuses engendered by the
government's use of in rem forfeiture-like those seen in Austin and
Good-would be minimized. In Austin, if forfeiture had been done
criminally, the Excessive Fines Clause would plainly have limited the
punishment imposed on Austin. 241 Given that criminal sanctions must
be a multiple of the harm done to adequately deter, the forfeiture would
240.
Public choice theory provides another rationale for distinguishing real property
forfeitures from the traditional forfeiture of personal property to enforce the revenue
laws. The conduct underlying the revenue laws-making income or importing goods---is
not criminally proscribed, and those engaged in such activities constitute a viable lobby
if enforcement agents abuse their powers or exact forfeitures without justification. The
unavailability of political redress separates civil forfeiture under the Drug Act from civil
forfeiture under the revenue laws. In passing the Drug Act, Congress was not collecting
taxes that drug dealers might otherwise evade. Congress does not admit to collecting
revenues from drug trafficking; rather, it expressly intends to punish and deter drug
traffickers. "It was hoped that through the use of current criminal and civil forfeiture
provisions, forfeiture would become a powerful weapon in the fight against drug
trafficking and racketeering." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., \st Sess. 194 (1983),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3377. Civil forfeiture for revenue violations is
part of an escalating scale of penalties, with criminal sanctions reserved for egregious
cases. The drug laws, by contrast, begin with criminal sanctions. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-58
(1994). Civil forfeiture was added to enhance the deterrent value of those criminal
sanctions.
241.
Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2775 (1993).
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have been well within constitutional boundaries. Only when the sanction
is styled as a civil remedy do disproportionality concerns arise because
the sanction must be remedial rather than deterrent. Similarly, the due
process issue raised in Good would not arise under the criminal
forfeiture provisions242 because those procedures easily pass constitutional muster. 243 Of equal importance from society's perspective is the
reduction of agency costs identified in Part I that occurs when a criminal
conviction is required. Law enforcement officials would need to
criminally prosecute an individual to obtain forfeiture revenues, thus
decreasing their enthusiasm for forfeiture, while simultaneously
diminishing the risk that prosecutors and officers will maximize revenue
at the expense of deterrence.244
E.

Excessive Fines Clause

Once civil forfeiture has been confined to its appropriate domain by
the Due Process Clause, civil forfeitures will implicate only the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. 245 That clause is not limited by
its terms to criminal punishments, and it lends itself to disproportionality
concems. 246 We agree with the holding in Austin that there are sound

242.
Peter A. Winn, Seizures ofPrivate Property in the War Against Drugs: What
Process is Due?, 41 SW. L.J. Ill I, l 125 (1988). Winn comments on 21 U.S.C.
§§ 853(e)(2)(f):
Under the criminal forfeiture procedures the government, in order to seize
property prior to a criminal conviction, must make three showings: (I) that
probable cause exists to seize the property; (2) that preseizure notice would
likely render the property unavailable for forfeiture (i.e., an extraordinary
situation); and (3) that less restrictive means, such as a bond, restraining order,
or lis pendens, would not suffice to protect the government's interest.
Id.

243.
United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 615 (1989) (upholding 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(e)).
244.
Cf Stahl, supra note 194, at 335 (citing study showing "that parallel criminal
charges are filed in only twenty percent of § 88 l cases").
245.
See Henning, supra note 157, at 69 ("The only basis on which to judge
whether a sanction is proportional to the underlying violation is under the Excessive
Fines Clause.").
246.
See John C. Jeffiies, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages, 72 VA. L. REv. 139, 149 (1986) ("[A] nominally civil fine may be every bit
as 'excessive' as a criminal one and should be equally objectionable. This conclusion
is reinforced by the significant textual differences between the eighth amendment and
those Bill of Rights guarantees specifically limited to the criminal context."). There is
a substantial historical argument that the drafters of the Bill of the Rights sought to
proscribe only the use of imprisonment conditioned upon the payment of an unrealistic
fine. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 267 (1989)
(discussing events leading to the adoption of Section IO the English Bill of Rights,
which was adopted verbatim by Art. I, § 9 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which
in turn provided the basis for the Eighth Amendment); Brief for the United States,
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reasons to give broader scope to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against excessive fines than to its prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Specifically, the government benefits from forfeiture, while
imprisonment and related sanctions cost the government when it inflicts
them. 247 From an historical perspective, the use of civil forfeiture
recalls the English crown's abusive use of "amercements" before they
were limited by the Magna Charta. 248 The government has every
incentive to prefer fines over criminal actions; if left unchecked, it will
not hesitate to exact the most draconian sanctions in civil proceedings.
We disagree, however, with Austin's attempt to identify whether a
particular forfeiture is remedial or punitive. A case-by-case review for
excessiveness as applied can only lead to inconsistent treatment of
similarly situated defendants. The label "punitive" should be reserved
for sanctions that are traditionally criminal. Where the government
intends to punish, it plainly can impose a much heavier sanction than it
can in a civil proceeding: optimal deterrence requires a penalty that is
a multiple of the harm incurred by society. 249 Instead of searching for
an amorphous equilibrium between the harm caused and the
government's recovery, we think that the test for excessiveness of a civil
forfeiture should be grounded in the in rem tradition. Excessiveness

Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (No. 92-6073). This interpretation of
the of the original purpose of the clause has been disputed. See Calvin R. Massey, The
Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons From History, 40 VAND.
L. REV. 1233, 1240-69 (1987). In any event, the Court has held that all imprisonment
conditioned on the payment of a fine violates the Equal Protection Clause where the
defendant cannot realistically pay. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 399 (1971);
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970). The Excessive Fines Clause has thus
been stripped of its original function by free-ranging interpretation of other constitutional
provisions.
247.
See Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2693 n.9 (1991) (Scalia, J.),
Justice Scalia commented:
There is good reason to be concerned that fines, uniquely of all punishments,
will be imposed in a measure out of accord with the penal goals of retribution
and deterrence.
Imprisonment, corporal punishment and even capital
punishment cost a State money; fines are a source of revenue. As we have
recognized in the context of other constitutional provisions, it makes sense to
scrutinize governmental action more closely when the State stands to benefit.
Id.
248.
See Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 268-73 (discussing history of amercements); id. at 287-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same).
249.
See POSNER, supra note 30, at 222.
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should tum on civil forfeiture's rationale-the "guilty property"
fiction--measured by the fault of the offending property. We agree with
Justice Scalia that, "[t]he question is not how much the confiscated
property is worth, but whether the confiscated property has a close
enough relationship to the offense."250 If the object has an obvious
connection to the illegal act, then, whatever the culpability of its owner,
the sanction is not "excessive."251 Contraband, guns used in a crime,
and mislabeled or dangerous goods easily pass such scrutiny. Where the
object lacks such an obvious connection because it has more than one
use (e.g., a conveyance in which marijuana is found), the government
must show that the property has a close nexus to the crime and to the
historical function of in rem forfeiture. On this test, a vessel used to
smuggle drugs into the country or goods imported without paying
customs duties, are plainly forfeitable. Where the property has a less
obvious connection to the historical function of forfeiture, such as an
automobile, the relevant question should be whether the car was used to
facilitate the crime. For example, a car which transported cocaine for
sale would be forfeitable, regardless of the car's value, while a car in
which one marijuana cigarette was found would not be forfeitable, again
regardless of the car's value. 252 The appropriate inquiry focuses on the
instrumentality's fault, not amorphous balancing of harm and remedy.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In this Article, we have shown how civil forfeiture leads police and
prosecutors to excessive enforcement of drug prohibition. The revenues
available from civil forfeiture have made drug crime a top priority at the
expense of fighting other crimes. These revenues have also made civil
forfeiture the preferred crime-fighting weapon against drug crime. That
weapon, however, is susceptible to abuse, and brings with it increased
violence and property crime.
We have also shown how civil forfeiture's potential for abuse
increased substantially when the Court cut it loose from its moorings in
enforcing the customs laws. Civil forfeiture was introduced into a
context where its functional justification--the unavailability of personal

250.
See Austin v. United States, I 13 S. Ct. 2801, 2815 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). See also United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365-66 (4th Cir. 1994)
(applying instrumentality test for excessiveness).
251.
See Austin, I 13 S. Ct. at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Scales used to
measure out unlawful drug sales, for example, are confiscable whether made of the
purest gold or the basest metal."); United States v. Cullen, 979 F.2d. 992, 995 (4th Cir.
1992) ("[T]he Ferrari is at least as harmful an instrumentality as the Chevette.").
252.
See Clark, supra note 145, at 479.
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jurisdiction over the wrongdoer-largely did not apply. This departure
from common law traditions led the Court into confusion when it later
attempted to curb civil forfeiture's abuses. Unwilling to limit the
government to traditional common law procedures, the Court has
afforded itself flexibility in its due process analysis. That flexibility,
however, has carried with it a substantial cost. Having abandoned
tradition, the Court has found no alternative to confront the patent
injustices that have accompanied the expansion of civil forfeiture. The
result has been doctrinal confusion and a mish-mash of ad hoc balancing
exercises.
In response to that confusion, we offer an alternative constitutional
framework grounded in the historical function and practice of civil
forfeiture. Under our rule, personal property ordinarily could be
forfeited civilly, but real property forfeiture would require a criminal
conviction. Our constitutional regime, while remaining true to common
law tradition, would limit forfeiture's worst abuses by affording property
owners criminal procedures in those cases which pose the greatest risks
of disproportionality and erroneous determinations. Moreover, our
regime would limit those abuses in a principled and predictable rulebased fashion, rather than relying on ad hoc balancing. As the Court
plunges ahead in its efforts to rein in forfeiture, we suggest that
traditional practice, tested by time, may provide the surest guide.
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